City of Bacolod v San Miguel Brewery Inc. (Civil Procedure)

Digest # 1

G.R. No. L-25134 October 30, 1969

THE CITY OF BACOLOD, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., defendant-appellant.
First Assistant City Fiscal Raymundo O. Rallos for plaintiff-appellee. Picazo and Agcaoili for defendant-appellant.

BARREDO, J.: 

FACTS:
1/24 OF A CENTAVO FOR EVERY BOTTLE
On February 17, 1949, the City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949 imposing upon "any person, firm or corporation engaged in the manufacturer bottling of coca-cola, pepsi cola, tru orange, lemonade, and other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, ... a fee of ONE TWENTY-FOURTH (1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year," upon "such local manufacturers or bottler above-mentioned who will be delinquent on any amount of fees due" under the ordinance.

1/8 OF A CENTAVO FOR EVERY BOTTLE
In 1959, this ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959, by increasing the fee to "one-eighth (1/8) of a centavo for every bottle thereof." In other words, the fee was increased from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft drinks. Appellant refused to pay the additional fee and challenged the validity of the whole ordinance.
Hence, City of Bacolod sued San Miguel.

1ST SET OF DECISIONS:
*CFI- Negros: San Miguel Brewery Inc. is ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P26,306.54 and the tax at the rate of three centavos per case levied in Ordinance No. 66 and 150 from March, 1960, and thereafter.
*SC: Court affirmed the decision appealed from and upheld the constitutionality of the questioned ordinances and the authority of the appellee to enact the same.
AFTER FINALITY, MR FOR INCLUSION OF PENALTIES & SURCHARGES For reasons not extant in the record, it was already after this decision had become final when appellee moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying that the same be amended so as to include the penalties and surcharges provided for in the ordinances.
*SC (MR): denied.
When execution was had before the lower court, the appellee again sought the inclusion of the surcharges referred to.
*CFI-Negros: denied.
Failing thus in its attempt to collect the surcharge provided for in the ordinances in question, appellee filed a second action (Civil Case No. 7355) to collect the said

surcharges.

2ND SET OF DECISIONS:
*Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental: ordering the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the City of Bacolod the sum of P36,519.10, representing surcharges on certain fees which, under existing ordinances of the City of Bacolod, the San Miguel Brewery should have paid quarterly to the treasurer of the said city for and/or during the period from July, 1959 to December, 1962, but which were paid only on April 23, 1963.
Appellants San Miguel moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied, hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUE:
WON City of Bacolod's claim for surcharges still be taken cognizance by the court

HELD:
NO, it involves splitting of actions which is prohibited by the Rules of Court.
In the light of these precedents, it cannot be denied that appellant's failure to pay the bottling charges or taxes and the surcharges for delinquency in the payment thereof constitutes but one single cause of action which under the above rule can be the subject of only one complaint, under pain of either of them being barred if not included in the same complaint with the other. The error of appellee springs from a misconception or a vague comprehension of the elements of a cause of action.
The classical definition of a cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by which the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the defendant." Its elements may be generally stated to be
(1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff;
(2) a corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission of the plaintiff which constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to respect. For purposes, however, of the rule against splitting up of a cause of action, a clearer understanding can be achieved, if together with these elements, the right to relief is considered.

IMPORTANT
Again the violation of a single right may give rise to more than one relief. In other words, for a single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting up of the cause of action. This is what is prohibited by the rule.
The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in force then provided:
SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. — A single cause of action cannot be split up into two or more parts so as to be made the subject of different complaints. .
SEC. 4. Effect of splitting. — If separate complaints were brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the

others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the others.
It comes from that old maxim nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). 

Digest # 2

The City of Bacolod v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

Facts:

·       The city of Bacolod passed an ordinance imposing upon manufacture corporations engaged in bottling of soft drinks a fee of 1/24 of a centavo, plus 2% surcharge every month, but in no case exceeding 24% for one year for delinquent payers;

·       The fee was increased from 1/24 (0.01 cents) to 1/8 (0.03 cents);

·       Respondent refused to pay so petitioner filed a case against it at the CFI Negros Occ., where the latter prayed for the payment of the fee, but without mention of the surcharge;

·       Respondent lost in the CFI and so it raised the constitutionality of the ordinance before the SC where the SC upheld its constitutionality and affirmed the CFI decision;

·       Failing to collect the surcharge, however, petitioner filed another case before the CFI for the collection of the surcharge;

Lower court decisions:

CFI: ordered the respondent to pay the surcharge, denied reconsideration

*SC directly

Issue: WON there is a splitting of cause of action

Ruling: Yes, there is a splitting of cause of action.

For a single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting of action.

At bar, when respondent failed and refused to pay the difference in bottling charges, it violated  the right of petitioner, thus the latter being entitled to two reliefs: (1) recovery of basic charges; and (2) payment of corresponding surcharge, the latter being merely a consequence of the failure to pay the former. In other words, the obligation of respondent to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by it of the same right of the petitioner from which the obligation to pay the basic charges also arose.

Upon these facts, it is obvious that petitioner has filed separate complaints for each of the two reliefs related to the same single cause of action, thereby splitting up the said cause of action.