De la Llana v Alba (Constitution)

De la LLana v Alba
GR No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

Fernando, C.J.:

FACTS:
(1) Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 129 entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes" is constitutional

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.

RATIO:
(1) Petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as tax payers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated.
(2) Confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. (3) There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent."
(4) Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future."
(5) Nothing is bettersettled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganiz e them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions.

Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office

during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to

discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Courten banc shall have the power to

discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the

Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted

thereon.

(6) The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, and other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well as in municipalities, and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that ex isting inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy.
(7) I t is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carryout national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v . Labang it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches."
(8) To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X , Section 7 of the Constitution. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. I n case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise
(9) To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to re organize inferior courts and in the process to abolish ex isting ones.
(10) Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of a standard is thus clear.
(11) The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. The work of justices was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies.