INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS V ARGOS (2001)
G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001 INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner, vs. MERLIN J.
ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc., hereafter IFFI, is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of IFFI.
In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporation's operation in the Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director. Consequently the general managers reported directly to Costa.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim" on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a "Personnel Announcement" which described respondents as "persona non grata" and urged employees not to have further dealings with them.
On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of two Informations against Costa. On March 31, 1995, respondents fi1ed'a civil case for damages filed and docketed as Civil Case No. 65026 at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: initially granted the motion to dismiss filed by Costa and IFFI but reconsidered its position.
(2) CA: dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner's employee?
RULING:
No.
The well-established rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of an action. A perusal of the respondents' civil complaint before the regional trial court plainly shows that respondents is suing IFFI in a subsidiary and not primary capacity insofar as the damages claimed are concerned.
A pleading must be construed most strictly against the pleader. He is presumed to have stated all the facts involved, and to have done so as favorably to himself as his conscience will permit. So, if material allegations were omitted, it will be presumed in the absence of an application to amend that those matters do not exist. This is a basic rule in pleadings.
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.
FACTS:
Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc., hereafter IFFI, is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of IFFI.
In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporation's operation in the Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director. Consequently the general managers reported directly to Costa.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim" on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a "Personnel Announcement" which described respondents as "persona non grata" and urged employees not to have further dealings with them.
On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of two Informations against Costa. On March 31, 1995, respondents fi1ed'a civil case for damages filed and docketed as Civil Case No. 65026 at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: initially granted the motion to dismiss filed by Costa and IFFI but reconsidered its position.
(2) CA: dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner's employee?
RULING:
No.
The well-established rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of an action. A perusal of the respondents' civil complaint before the regional trial court plainly shows that respondents is suing IFFI in a subsidiary and not primary capacity insofar as the damages claimed are concerned.
A pleading must be construed most strictly against the pleader. He is presumed to have stated all the facts involved, and to have done so as favorably to himself as his conscience will permit. So, if material allegations were omitted, it will be presumed in the absence of an application to amend that those matters do not exist. This is a basic rule in pleadings.
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.
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