Padilla v CA (Torts)

PADILLA v CA G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS:
1. The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused prevented Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise 

Contentions:

Vergara Family
1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation. 

Roy Padilla, et al

1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence
2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se

3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premise

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.

(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief

Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds

1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him
2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. The exceptions are when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.
Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. That the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission.

The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.