PERLA COMPANIA v SPS. SARANGAYA (2005)
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. PASCUAL, - versus - SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III and PRIMITIVA B. SARANGAYA, Respondents.
FACTS:
In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. (petitioner- corporation), through its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the “Super A Building,” abutting the office of Matsushita. Petitioner- corporation renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The left side was converted into an office while the right was used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a company-provided vehicle he used in covering the different towns within his area of supervision. On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned to Santiago and, after checking his appointments the next day, decided to “warm up” the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an “odd” sound and did not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed
the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.
Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and appliances.
Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for “Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Damage in (sic) Property” was filed against petitioner Pascual. At the prosecutor’s office, petitioner Pascual moved for the withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted.
Respondents later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi- delict against petitioners for a “sum of money and damages,” alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Trial Court: ruled in favor of respondents.
(2) CA: affirmed RTC
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
RULING:
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: 1. the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3. the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. “Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved.
Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year- model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year- old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident.
While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire. The relationship between the two petitioners was based on the principle of pater familias according to which the employer becomes liable to the party aggrieved by its employee if he fails to prove due diligence of a good
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. PASCUAL, - versus - SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III and PRIMITIVA B. SARANGAYA, Respondents.
FACTS:
In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. (petitioner- corporation), through its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the “Super A Building,” abutting the office of Matsushita. Petitioner- corporation renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The left side was converted into an office while the right was used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a company-provided vehicle he used in covering the different towns within his area of supervision. On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned to Santiago and, after checking his appointments the next day, decided to “warm up” the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an “odd” sound and did not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed
the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.
Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and appliances.
Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for “Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Damage in (sic) Property” was filed against petitioner Pascual. At the prosecutor’s office, petitioner Pascual moved for the withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted.
Respondents later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi- delict against petitioners for a “sum of money and damages,” alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Trial Court: ruled in favor of respondents.
(2) CA: affirmed RTC
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
RULING:
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: 1. the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3. the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. “Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved.
Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year- model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year- old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident.
While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire. The relationship between the two petitioners was based on the principle of pater familias according to which the employer becomes liable to the party aggrieved by its employee if he fails to prove due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It also did not have any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep
of company property like the vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its
properties either.
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