YHT Realty Corporation v CA (Torts)

YHT REALTY CORPORATION v CA [G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005.] YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA PAYAM, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE McLOUGHLIN, respondents.

FACTS: 
Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used to stay at Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984 when he met Tan. Tan befriended McLoughlin by showing him around, introducing him to important people, accompanying him in visiting impoverished street children and assisting him in buying gifts for the children and in distributing the same to charitable institutions for poor children. Tan convinced McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez served as manager of the hotel while Lainez and Payam had custody of the keys for the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlin's booking at the Tropicana where he started staying during his trips to the Philippines from December 1984 to September 1987. 

On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of the procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety deposit boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened through the use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel. When a registered guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the management who then would assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety deposit box with the two keys.

McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box: Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00) which he placed in two envelopes, one envelope containing Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) and the other envelope Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00); Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00) which he also placed in another envelope; two (2) other envelopes containing letters and credit cards; two (2) bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit box.

On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong, McLoughlin opened his safety deposit box with his key and with the key of the management and took therefrom the envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), the envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and his credit cards. 6 McLoughlin left the other items in the box as he did not check out of his room at the Tropicana during his short visit to Hongkong. When he arrived in Hongkong, he opened the envelope which contained Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00) and discovered upon counting that only Three Thousand US Dollars (US$3,000.00) were enclosed therein. After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana on 18 December 1987 and left for Australia. When he arrived in Australia, he discovered that the envelope with Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) was short of Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000). He also noticed that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet.

When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to him. 11 McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlin's key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. 12 Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.

Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note dated 21 April 1988. The promissory note reads as follows:
I promise to pay Mr. Maurice McLoughlin the amount of AUS$4,000.00 and US$2,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency on or before May 5, 1988.

However, Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box entitled "Undertaking For the Use Of Safety Deposit Box," 15 specifically paragraphs (2) and (4) thereof, to wit: To release and hold free and blameless TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from any liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the said deposit box for any cause whatsoever, including but not limited to the presentation or use thereof by any other person should the key be lost

Thus, he filed a complaint for damages on 3 December 1990 against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan (defendants) for the loss of McLoughlin's money which was discovered on 16 April 1988.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: ordered defendants to plaintiffs.
(2) CA: affirmed the disquisitions made by the lower court except as to the amount of damages awarded

ISSUE:
whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers

RULING:
NO. 
in case of loss of any item deposited in the safety deposit box, it is inevitable to conclude that the management had at least a hand in the consummation of the taking, unless the reason for the loss is force majeure
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his act, made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him most of the time. The evidence on record, however, is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the management as his wife. Such an inference from the act of McLoughlin will not exculpate the petitioners from liability in the absence of any showing that he made the management believe that Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have access to the safety deposit box. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to warrant such conclusion considering that what is involved in the instant case is the very safety of McLoughlin's deposit.
In light of the circumstances surrounding this case, it is undeniable that without the acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the opening of the safety deposit box, the loss of McLoughlin's money could and should have been avoided.

SPECIAL CONTRACTS; QUASI-DELICTS; EMPLOYERS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. — Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear the burden of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to prove the negligence of such employer. Thus, given the fact that the loss of McLoughlin's money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicana's employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit box without the guest's consent, both the assisting employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193.
Art. 2003 of the Civil Code provides: The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void. Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carrier's business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotel-keepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel-keepers on guests for their signature. 

Theis v CA (Torts)

THEIS v CA [G.R. No. 126013. February 12, 1997.] SPOUSES HEINZRICH THEIS AND BETTY THEIS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE ELEUTERIO GUERRERO, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH XVIII, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGAYTAY CITY, CALSONS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Calsons Development Corporation is the owner of three (3) adjacent parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 15515 (parcel no. 1 in the location map), 15516 (parcel no. 2) and 15684 (parcel no. 3), with the area of 1,000 square meters, 226 square meters and 1,000 square meters, respectively.
On October 26, 1987, unaware of the mistake by which private respondent appeared to be the owner of parcel no. 4 as indicated in the erroneous survey, and based on the erroneous information given by the surveyor that parcel no. 4 is covered by TCT No. 15516 and 15684, private respondent, through its authorized representative, one Atty. Tarcisio S. Calilung, sold said parcel no. 4 to petitioners. All three parcels of land are situated along Ligaya Drive, Barangay Francisco, Tagaytay City. Adjacent to parcel no. 3, which is the lot covered by TCT No. 15684 is a vacant lot denominated as parcel no. 4.

Upon execution of the Deed of Sale, private respondent delivered TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684 to petitioners who, on October 28, 1987, immediately registered the same with the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay City. Thus, TCT Nos. 17041 and 17042 in the names of the petitioners were issued.
In the early part of 1990, petitioners returned to the Philippines. When they went to Tagaytay to look over the vacant lots and to plan the construction of their house thereon, they discovered that parcel no. 4 was owned by another person. They also discovered that the lots actually sold to them were parcel nos. 2 and 3 covered by TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684. respectively. Parcel no. 3, however, could not have been sold to the petitioners by the private respondents as a two-storey house, the construction cost of which far exceeded the price paid by the petitioners, had already been built thereon even prior to the execution of the contract between the disputing parties.
Petitioners insisted that they wanted parcel no. 4, which is the idle lot adjacent to parcel no. 3, and persisted in claiming that it was parcel no. 4 that private respondent sold to them. However, private respondent could not have possibly sold the same to them for it did not own parcel no. 4 in the first place.

The mistake in the identity of the lots is traceable to the erroneous survey conducted in 1985.

To remedy the mistake, private respondent offered parcel nos. 1 and 2 covered by TCT Nos. 15515 and 15516, respectively, as these two were precisely the two vacant lots which private respondent owned and intended to sell when it entered into the transaction with petitioners. Petitioners adamantly rejected the good faith offer. They refused to yield to reason and insisted on taking parcel no. 3, covered by TCT No. 155864 and upon which a two-storey house stands, in addition to parcel no. 2, covered by TCT No. 15516, on the ground that these TCTs have already been cancelled and new ones issued in their name. Private respondent was then compelled to file an action for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of the properties subject thereof 1 in the Regional Trial Court.

DECISIONS OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. 
(2) Court of Appeals: affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the sale is voidable

RULING:
Yes
Private respondent committed an honest mistake in selling parcel no. 4. As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, it is quite impossible for private respondent to sell the lot in question as the same is not owned by it. The good faith of the private respondent is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it immediately offered two other vacant lots to the petitioners or to reimburse them with twice the amount paid. That petitioners refused either option left the private respondent with no other choice but to file an action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of mistake. Art. 1331 of the New Civil Code provides for the situations whereby mistake may invalidate consent. The concept of error in this article must include both ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge with respect to a thing and mistake properly speaking, which is a wrong conception about said thing, or a belief in the existence of some circumstance, fact, or event, which in reality does not exist. In both cases, there is a lack of full and correct knowledge about the thing. The mistake committed by the private respondent in selling parcel no. 4 to the petitioners falls within the second type. Verily, such mistake invalidated its consent and as such, annulment of the deed of sale is proper. The petitioners cannot be justified in their insistence that parcel no. 3, upon which private respondent constructed a two-storey house, be given to them in lieu of parcel no. 4. The cost of construction for the said house far exceeds the amount paid by the petitioners to the private respondent. Moreover, parcel no. 4, the lot mistakenly sold, was a vacant lot. Thus, to allow the petitioners to take parcel no. 3 would be to countenance unjust enrichment. Considering that petitioners intended at the outset to purchase a vacant lot, their refusal to accept the offer of the private respondent to give them two (2) other vacant lots in exchange, as well as their insistence on parcel no. 3, which is a house and lot, is manifestly unreasonable. 

Gatchalian v Delim (Torts)

GATCHALIAN v DELIM [G.R. No. 56487. October 21, 1991.] REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini-bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, La Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead, specifically described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion, elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral surface, leg, left.

On 14 July 1973, while injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit
petitioner Gatchalian filed with the then Court of First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus.
(2) Court of Appeals: reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages:

ISSUE:
Is the waiver valid?

RULING:
No.
Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.

CIVIL LAW; HUMAN RELATIONS; WAIVER OF RIGHT; RULE FOR ITS VALIDITY. — A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST NOT BE CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, PUBLIC POLICY AND GOOD CUSTOMS. — Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy. 

Go v IAC (Torts)

GO v IAC [G.R. No. 68138. May 13, 1991.] AGUSTIN Y. GO and THE CONSOLIDATED BAND AND TRUST CORPORATION (Solidbank), petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FLOVERTO JAZMIN, respondents.

FACTS:
Floverto Jazmin is an American citizen and retired employee of the United States Federal Government. He had been a visitor in the Philippines since 1972 residing at 34 Maravilla Street, Mangatarem, Pangasinan. As a pensionado of the U.S. government, he received annuity checks in the amounts of $67.00 for disability and $620.00 for retirement through the Mangatarem post office. He used to encash the checks at the Prudential Bank branch at Clark Air Base, Pampanga.
Meanwhile, on April 22, 1975, Agustin Go, in his capacity as branch manager of the then Solidbank (which later became the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation) in Baguio City, allowed a person named "Floverto Jazmin" to open Savings Account No. BG 5206 by depositing two (2) U.S. treasury checks Nos. 5-449-076 and 5-448-890 in the respective amounts of $1810.00 and $913.40
The depositor's signature specimens were also taken.
Thereafter, the deposited checks were sent to the drawee bank for clearance. Inasmuch as Solidbank did not receive any word from the drawee bank, after three (3) weeks, it allowed the depositor to withdraw the amount indicated in the checks.
On June 29, 1976 or more than a year later, the two dollar checks were returned to Solidbank with the notation that the amounts were altered. 3 Consequently, Go reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary in Baguio City. Eventually, the investigators found that the person named "Floverto Jazmin" who made the deposit and withdrawal with Solidbank was an impostor.
On September 24, 1976, Jazmin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch II at Lingayen a complaint against Agustin Y. Go and the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of P90,000 plus attorney's fees of P5,000.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Lower court: found that Go was negligent in failing to exercise "more care, caution and vigilance" in accepting the checks for deposit and encashment.
(2) Court of Appeals: failure to notice the substantial difference in the identity of the depositor and the payee in the check, concluded that Go's negligence in the performance of his duties was "the proximate cause why appellant bank was swindled" and that denouncing the crime to the constabulary authorities "merely aggravated the situation.

ISSUE:
Whether Go is liable

RULING:
Yes.
The facts of this case reveal that damages in the form of mental anguish, moral shock and social humiliation were suffered by private respondent only after the filing of the petitioners' complaint with the Philippine Constabulary. It was only then that he had to bear the inconvenience of travelling to Benguet and Lingayen for the investigations as it was only then that he was subjected to embarrassment for being a suspect in the unauthorized alteration of the treasury checks. Hence, it is understandable why petitioners appear to have overlooked the facts antecedent to the filing of the complaint to the constabulary authorities and to have put undue emphasis on the appellate court's statement that "denouncing a crime is not negligence." Although this Court has consistently held that there should be no penalty on the right to litigate and that error alone in the filing of a case be it before the courts or the proper police authorities, is not a ground for moral damages, we hold that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, private respondent is entitled to an award of damages.
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. As Go's negligence was the root cause of the complained inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment, Go is liable to private respondents for damages.
Anent petitioner bank's claim that it is not "co-equally liable" with Go for damages, under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, "(E)mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks." Pursuant to this provision, the bank is responsible for the acts of its employee unless there is proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Hence, the burden of proof lies upon the bank and it cannot now disclaim liability in view of its own failure to prove not only that it exercised due diligence to prevent damage but that it was not negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. 

Dulay v CA (Torts)

DULAY v CA [G.R. No. 108017. April 3, 1995.] MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her, own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: the complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether Superguard is liable

RULING:
The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits.

The complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses.

It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.

Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that: ". . . Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault or negligence,' covers not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held: "Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary." [Citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]

Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. 

Yobido v CA (Torts)

YOBIDO v CA [G.R. No. 113003. October 17, 1997.] ALBERTA YOBIDO and CRESENCIO YOBIDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LENY TUMBOY, ARDEE TUMBOY and JASMIN TUMBOY, respondents.

FACTS:
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children, Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria, Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus suddenly exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree which resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers. Thereafter, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees was filed by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Defenses:
Abundio Salce, who was the bus conductor when the incident happened, testified that 1. the 42-seater bus was not full as there were only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat;
2. the bus was running at a speed of "60 to 50" and that it was going slow because of the zigzag road.
3. the left front tire that exploded was a "brand new tire" that he mounted on the bus on April 21, 1988 or only five (5) days before the incident.

DECISION:
(1) Trial Court: dismissing the action for lack of merit
(2) Court of Appeals: rendered a decision reversing that of the lower court

ISSUE:
Whether the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event

RULING:
No.

A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; 
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. 

As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.

There is no reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners' contention that they are exempted from liability because the tire blowout was a fortuitous event that could not have been foreseen, must fail. It is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. Accordingly, the challenged decision is affirmed subject to modification that petitioners shall additionally pay herein, respondents P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days' use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages.

It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary measures considering partially dangerous condition of the road. As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient proof that it was not negligent. Petitioners should have shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of the vehicle's parts. As the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: "It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of each and every part of its vehicles before each trip, but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the carrier's obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safety of the passengers."

It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor, Salce, that the bus was running at "60-50" kilometers per hour only within the prescribed lawful speed limit. However, they failed to rebut the testimony of Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down. These contradictory facts must, therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in view of the presumption of negligence of the carrier in the law. 

Servando v Phil Steam (Torts)

SERVANDO v PHIL STEAM [G.R. Nos. L-36481-2. October 23, 1982.] AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO, plaintiffs- appellees, vs. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded their respective cargoes on board appellant's vessel for carriage from Manila to Negros Occidental. Upon arrival of the vessel at the place of destination, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, into the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. After appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of apportion of her cargoes, the warehouse was rated by fire of unknown origin, destroying the rest of the two appellees' cargoes. Appellees filed their claims from appellant for the recovery of the value of the goods destroyed by fire.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: ruled in favor of appellees and ordered payment of their claims, stating that since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether Philippine Steam Navigation Co. is liable?

RULING: 
No.
Appellant, as obligor, is exempt from liability for non- performance because the burning of the warehouse containing appellees' goods, which is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, is a fortuitous event or force majeure which could not have been foreseen by appellant.

Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for non- performance. (See Art. 1174 of the New Civil Code.)
The Partidas(Law II, Title 33, Partida 7), the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso fortuito" as "an event that takes place by accident and could not been have foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers."

In the dissertation of the phrase "caso fortuito" the Encyclopedia Juridicada Española says: "In a legal sense and consequently, also in relation to contracts, caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) the cause of the unforseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will;
(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; 
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it imposible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to creditor."

There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, out had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.

Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever over the same.
The lower court in its decision relied on the ruling laid down in Yu Biao Sontua vs. Ossorio, 43 Phil. 511, where this Court held the defendant liable for damages arising from a fire caused by the negligence of the defendant's employees while loading cases of gasoline and petroleum products. But unlike in the said case, there is not a shred of proof in the present case that the cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom's warehouse was in any way attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees. Under the circumstances, the appellant is plainly not responsible. 

Gotesco v Chatto (Torts)

GOTESCO v CHATTO [G.R. No. 87584. June 16, 1992.] GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GLORIA E. CHATTO and LINA DELZA CHATTO, respondents.

FACTS:
In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie 'Mother Dear' at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment (Exh. "E") She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or six (6) times.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: ordered the defendant, herein petitioner, to pay the plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto

ISSUE:
Whether Gotesco is liable

RULING:
Yes

Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed."
Clearly, there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer, he is a graduate of architecture from the St. Louie (sic) University in Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. (TSN, June 14, 1985, p. 4) In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated as an act of God. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence."

Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. 

Verily, the post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was no shown that any of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. It is settled that: "The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means." This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: "Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant." That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.

As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure, for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence. 

De Guzman v Toyota (Torts)

DE GUZMAN v TOYOTA [G.R. No. 141480. November 29, 2006.] CARLOS B. DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., respondent.

FACTS:
On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS double cab motor vehicle, 1996 model, in the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a down payment of P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600 which was payable in 36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998 (approximately 20 days after), petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. Last 18 October 1998, after only 12,000 kilometers of use, the vehicle's engine cracked. Although it was previously driven through a heavy rain, it didn't pass through flooded streets high enough to stop sturdy and resistant vehicles. Besides, vehicles of this class are advertised as being capable of being driven on flooded areas or rugged terrain.Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty.
On April 20, 1999 (19 months from delivery), petitioner filed a complaint for damages.

Defense:
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, the petitioner's cause of action had prescribed as the case was filed more than six months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: granted respondent's motion and dismissed the complaint. The Court agrees with the plaintiff's counsel that the subject pick- up is a consumer product because it is used for personal, family or agricultural purposes, contrary to defendant counsel's claim that it is not because it is a non-consumable item.
Since no warranty card or agreement was attached to the complaint, the contract of sale of the subject pick-up carried an implied warranty that it was free from any hidden faults or defects, or any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer. The prescriptive period thereof is six (6) months under the Civil Code (Art. 1571).

ISSUE:
Whether the action has prescribed

RULING:

Yes.
Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner's complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. 7 Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle), his cause of action had become time-barred.
Consequently, even if the complaint is made to fall under the Republic Act No. 7394, the same should still be dismissed since the prescriptive period for implied warranty thereunder, which is one year, had likewise lapsed. 

Santos v Pizardo (Torts)

SANTOS v PIZARDO [G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005.] SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS, President/Chairman, respondents.

FACTS:
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van's driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two- month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the van's passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners' cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
(2) CA: dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal

ISSUE:
Has the action prescribed?

RULING:
No.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners' claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.

WHEN PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION EX DELICTO WILL OPERATE AS A BAR TO AN ACTION TO ENFORCE INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company was decided upon a similar set of facts. . . . We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners' allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime. This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons. 

Kramer v CA (Torts)

KRAMER v CA [G.R. No. 83524. October 13, 1989.] ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARTA KRAMER, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS:
in the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans- Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.

On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer. 

On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City.

Defense:
(1) the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period.
Allegation:
(1) maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date.


DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: observed that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision
(2) CA: granted the Petition filed by the private respondent and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Complaint. The cause of action of private respondent (the herein petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer) accrued from the occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and from which relief from the court is presently sought.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations

RULING: Yes.

QUASI-DELICT; CAUSE OF ACTION; ACCRUAL THEREOF TOLLED UPON OCCURRENCE OF THE LAST ELEMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION. — In Español vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, his Court held "The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . . . It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen . . ." It is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

TORTS AND DAMAGES; ACTION BASED UPON A QUASI-DELICT PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4) YEARS. — Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.

ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM COLLISION OF TWO VESSELS; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD COUNTED FROM DAY OF COLLISION NOT FROM THE DATE OF DETERMINATION BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. — In this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period. 

Raynera v Hiceta (Torts)

RAYNERA V HICETA [G.R. No. 120027. April 21, 1999.] EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors RIANNA and REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners, vs. FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners herein are heirs of Reynaldo Raynera who was killed by an accident on his way home at about 2:00 A.M. Respondents, Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck trailer which was involved in the said accident. On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. 4 The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well lighted. At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo 6 rushed him to the Parañaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, 7 pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.
At time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department, Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. The heirs of the deceased demanded from respondents' payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo as a result of the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the claims. Petitioners, hence, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila a complaint for damages against respondents' owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. Petitioners sought recovery of the damages caused by the negligent operation of the truck- trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail the lights.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that respondents' negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death. The trial court also applied the doctrine of contributory negligence and reduced the responsibility of respondents by 20%.
(2) Court of Appeals: held that the victim's bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause of his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from liability.

ISSUE:
Whether the truck is responsible for the accident

RULING: No.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)" 25 respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE; THE DRIVERS OF THE VEHICLES "WHO BUMP THE REAR OF ANOTHER VEHICLE" ARE PRESUMED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, UNLESS CONTRADICTED BY OTHER EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. — It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence." The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway. 

INELCO v CA (Torts)

[G.R. No. 53401. November 6, 1989.] THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.

FACTS:
in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Wading in waistdeep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.

When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in-law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.

In another place, at about 4:00 AM. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero.

At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another inspection trip. Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been taken.

In the afternoon of the same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968.

Defenses:
(1) electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property.
(2) service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in question.
(3) installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.
(4) 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them.
(5) deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner.
(6) deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) CFI – Ilocos Norte: defendant is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs

ISSUE:
Whether INELCO is liable

RULING:
Yes.

PETITIONER NOT EXONERATED AS VICTIM'S DEATH IS CAUSED BY ITS NEGLIGENCE. — The respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.

Under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public". . . considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).

A PERSON WHO VOLUNTARILY ASSENTS TO A KNOWN DANGER MUST ABIDE BY THE CONSEQUENCES; EXCEPTIONS. — The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" (To a willing person, injury is not done) relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence (174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.

"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office. The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner. 

Afialda v Hisole (Torts)

AFIALDA v HISOLE [G.R. No. L-2075. November 29, 1949.] MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants- appellees.

FACTS:
The now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:
"The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.
"This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it."

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Lower Court: owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code.

ISSUE:
whether the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker.

RULING:
No.
Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker.
For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. 

PNR v Brunty (Torts)

PNR v BRUNTY [G.R. No. 169891. November 2, 2006.] PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner, vs. ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS:
Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan with plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T- 71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila 4 as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980.
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. 5 A certain James Harrow 6 brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctor's Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was transferred to the Manila Doctor's Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for further treatment. 7
On July 28, 1981, Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter 8 to the PNR demanding payment of actual, compensatory, and moral damages, as a result of her daughter's death. When PNR did not respond, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint 9 for damages against the PNR before the RTC of Manila.

Allegations:
1. direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal, Municipality of Moncada, Tarlac.

2. there was no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was only equipped with a hand flashlight
3. failed to supervise its employees in the performance of their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and operator of the train
Defenses:
1. right of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has no legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. 2. there were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing.
3. the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelita's negligence, and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The driver disregarded the warning signs, the whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by the guard

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. RTC: directed PNR to pay
2. CA: affirmed RTC with modification as to amount of damages

ISSUE:
Is PNR liable?

RULING:
Yes

the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportatio
An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR itself would yield the following:
(1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars;
(2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and
(3.) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR (petitioner), it would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since one's view would be blocked by a cockpit arena
To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.
The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the place was not properly illuminated; one's view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was also established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did. However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not negate petitioner's liability. The record is bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding of contributory negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has the effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply.