PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. v IAC [G.R. No. 65295. March 10, 1987.] PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FACTS:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975— at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails- and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car
FACTS:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975— at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails- and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car
The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck,
front or rear. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into
the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel (2) IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages
Defenses: if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.
ISSUE:
Whether Phoenix is liable
RULING:
Yes.
Private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. Private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked — in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel.
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause.
In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
A man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel (2) IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages
Defenses: if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.
ISSUE:
Whether Phoenix is liable
RULING:
Yes.
Private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. Private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked — in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel.
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause.
In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
A man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former.
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