Smithbell Co. v CIR
FACTS:
The petitioner imported 119 cases of Chatteau Gay wine which it declared as “still wine” under Section 134b of the Tax
Code. The CIR later concluded that it should be classified as “sparkling wine” and as assessed the petitioner a deficiency specific tax thereon. Petitioner contends that the assessment is unconstitutional because Section 134a of the Tax Code under which it was issued lays down an insufficient and hazy standard by which the policy and purpose of the law may be ascertained, and gives the Commissioner blanket authority to decide what is or what is not the meaning of “sparkling wines.” Petitioner contends that there was an abdication of legislative power violative of the established doctrine, delegate potestas non potest delegare.
ISSUE:
Whether there was abdication of legislative power
RULING:
No. The purpose of the said provision is to impose a specific tax on wines and imitation wines. The first clause of Section 134 states so in plain language. The sole object of the sub-enumeration that follows is in turn unmistakably to prescribe the amount of the tax specifically to be paid for each type of wine and/or imitation wine so classified and described.
The section therefore clearly and undoubtedly discloses the legislative will, leaving to the officers charged with implementation and execution thereof nothing more than the administrative function of determining whether a particular kind of wine or imitation wine falls in one class or another.
The petitioner imported 119 cases of Chatteau Gay wine which it declared as “still wine” under Section 134b of the Tax
Code. The CIR later concluded that it should be classified as “sparkling wine” and as assessed the petitioner a deficiency specific tax thereon. Petitioner contends that the assessment is unconstitutional because Section 134a of the Tax Code under which it was issued lays down an insufficient and hazy standard by which the policy and purpose of the law may be ascertained, and gives the Commissioner blanket authority to decide what is or what is not the meaning of “sparkling wines.” Petitioner contends that there was an abdication of legislative power violative of the established doctrine, delegate potestas non potest delegare.
ISSUE:
Whether there was abdication of legislative power
RULING:
No. The purpose of the said provision is to impose a specific tax on wines and imitation wines. The first clause of Section 134 states so in plain language. The sole object of the sub-enumeration that follows is in turn unmistakably to prescribe the amount of the tax specifically to be paid for each type of wine and/or imitation wine so classified and described.
The section therefore clearly and undoubtedly discloses the legislative will, leaving to the officers charged with implementation and execution thereof nothing more than the administrative function of determining whether a particular kind of wine or imitation wine falls in one class or another.
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