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These are all original case digests or case briefs done while the author was studying law school in the Philippines.

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Monday, December 5, 2016

Quintos v Nicolas (2014)


VILMA QUINTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACTS FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR., ET AL. VS. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, ET AL. 
G.R. No. 210252. June 16, 2014

FACTS: Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by TCT No. 318717.

The deceased parents left their 10 children ownership over the subject property. In 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52 and was raffled to the RTC at Camiling, Tarlac but was later on dismissed as neither of the parties appeared and appealed.

Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of the 10 siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and TCT No. 390484 was issued in the names of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses. The siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale and Agreement of Subdivision, and the title was partially cancelled as a result.

Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein they alleged that during their parentslifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in favor of their 10 children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They had been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over 4 decades and are allegedly entitled to equitable title. Participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deeds was denied.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitionerscause of action was already barred by estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share, which is an admission petitionerspart that the property is not entirely theirs. The Ibarras allegedly mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property. Not having been repaid, the Candelarios accepted their share in the subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.

RTC: dismissed petitionerscomplaint, as it did not find merit in petitionersasseverations that they have acquired title over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted there was no document evidencing that their parents bequeathed the property. Subsequent transfer of the siblingsinterest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was upheld.


CA: upheld lower court decision and held that since the property is co-owned by the plaintiffs- appellants, ( 3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (7/10 undivided interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey building at the back portion of the property, partition is in order, in accord with the subdivision plan.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents
counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches
or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the partition of the property.


HELD: PETITION IS PARTLY MERITORIOUS.

Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. 


For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: 
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and 
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitionerscause of action must necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not petitioners sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue that is generally improper for Us to delve into.In any event, a perusal of the records would readily show that petitioners, as aptly observed by the courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim. Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners. Petitionersinability to offer evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latters claim.

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Regrettably, petitioners failed to discharge the said burden. There is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and respondent spouses became co-owners of the same.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment.

As to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their counterclaim, the petitioners countered that the action for partition has already been barred by res judicata.

The Court had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. It is understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. This is pertinent to Article 494 of the Civil Code which discusses how the law generally does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-ownersspecific shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common.


Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.

This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co- ownership does not or no longer exists.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches. We now proceed to petitionerssecond line of attack. According to petitioners, the claim for partition is already barred by laches since by 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and yet the respondent siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in 2002. And since laches has allegedly already set in against respondent siblings, so too should respondent spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the same for they could not have acquired a better right than their predecessors-in-interest.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which––by the exercise of due diligence––could or should have been done earlier. It is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. The principle is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon ones right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the petitionerstitle, but only with whether or not by reason of the respondentslong inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to do so would be inequitable and unjust to petitioners.

As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected to assert their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have abandoned their right given that they filed an action for partition. The fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract of Lease with Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject property is evidence that they are exercising rights of ownership over the same.

The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision. There is merit, however, in petitionerscontention that the CA erred in approving the proposal for partition submitted by respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that partition shall either be by agreement of the parties or in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition for respondents admitted that the agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same. The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to approve the agreement in spite of this fact would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to divide unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on their own whims and caprices. 

SOURCE: PALS 2016 (Prepared by: Dean Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis and the students of Lyceum of the Philippines University)

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