Victorias Milling Co. v. Victorias (1968)

Victorias Milling Co. vs. Municipality of Victorias 

GR L-21183, 27 September 1968

FACTS: 

Ordinance 1 (1956) was approved by the municipal council of Victorias by way of an amendment to 2 municipal ordinances separately imposing license taxes on operators of sugar centrals and sugar refineries. The changes were: (1) with respect to sugar centrals, by increasing the rates of license taxes; and (2) as to sugar refineries, by increasing the rates of license taxes as well as teh range of graduated schedule of annual output capacity. Victorias Milling questioned the validity of Ordinance 1 as it, among others, allegedly singled out Victorias Milling Co. since it is the only operator of a sugar central and a sugar refinery within the jurisdiction of the municipality. 

ISSUE: 

Whether Ordinance 1 is discriminatory. 

Whether the principle of pre-emption applies.

HELD: 

The ordinance does not single out Victorias as the only object of the ordinance but is made to apply to any sugar central or sugar refinery which may happen to operate in the municipality. The fact that Victorias Milling is actually the sole operator of a sugar central and a sugar refinery does not make the ordinance discriminatory. The ordinance is unlike that in Ormoc Sugar Company vs. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, which specifically spelled out Ormoc Sugar as the subject of the taxation, the name of the company herein was never mentioned in the ordinance. 

Upon the averment that in the Municipality of Victorias plaintiff is the only operator of a sugar central and sugar refinery, plaintiff now presses its argument that Ordinance No. 1, series of 1956, is discriminatory.  The ordinance does not single out Victorias as the only object of the ordinance.  Said ordinance is made to apply any sugar central or sugar refinery which may happen to operate in the municipality.  So it is, that the fact that plaintiff is actually the sole operator of a sugar central and a sugar refinery does not make ordinance discriminatory.  Argument along the same lines was rejected in Shell Co.of P.I., Ltd vs. Vaño, this Court holding that the circumstance "that there is no other person in the locality who exercises" the occupation designated as installation manager "does not make the ordinance discriminatory and hostile, inasmuch as it is and will be applicable to any person or firm who exercises such calling or occupation".

 And in Orrnoc Sugar Company, Inc. vs, Municipal Board of Ormoc City, declaratory relief was sought to test the validity of a municipal ordinance which provides a city tax of twenty centavos per picul of centrifugal sugar and one per centum on the gross sale of its derivatives and by-products "produced by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, or by any other sugar mill in Ormoc City". Mr. Justice Enrique Fernando, delivering the opinion of this Court, declared that ordinance did not suffer "from a constitutional or statutory infirmity".  And yet, in Ormoc it is to be observed that Section 1 of the ordinance spelled out Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated specifically by name.  Not even the name of plaintiff herein was ever mentioned in the ordinance now disputed.

No discrimination exists.

Preemption in the matter of taxation simply refers to an instance where the national government elects to tax a particular area, impliedly withholding from the local government the delegated power to tax the same field. This doctrine primarily rests upon the intention of Congress. Conversely, should Congress allow municipal corporations to cover fields of taxation it already occupies, then the doctrine of preemption will not apply.