Caunca v Salazar (Constitutional Law)

Caunca v Salazar
GR. No. L-2690
January I, 1949

Liberty of abode and travel

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.

Facts:

This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores, an orphan and an illiterate, who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. 

An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue:

Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?

Held:

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

Ratio:

On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid reason for respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with her desire to leave. Such indebtedness may be multiplied by thousands or millions but would not in any way subtract an iota from the fundamental right to have a free choice of abode. The fact that power to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business enterprise.

Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as household servant or farm laborer."

Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is prevented from leaving her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her.