San Luis v San Luis (Conflict of Laws)

San Luis v San Luis
2007

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

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G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

FACTS:

FACTS:

During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.

William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss  on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court

ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1,  Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."

For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.

(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.

The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.