People v Famudulan (2015)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ROD FAMUDULAN y FEDELIN
G.R. No. 2121944 July 6, 2015

Facts:
Appellant, a 42-year old man, was accused and charged with the crime of statutory rape against AAA. AAA, a 6-year old girl, testified that the appellant was her aunt’s neighbor.

The appellant cornered and ordered her to fellate him and he inserted his finger in her vaginal orifice and thereafter his organ. Thereafter, he threatened to kill her if she would tell anybody. She positively identified accused as her assailant in open court. The prosecution presented AAA and Dr. Adelaido Malaluan as its witnesses. Dr. Malaluan examined AAA and affirmed that he executed a Medico-Legal Report and that the injuries sustained by AAA may have been caused by a blunt object such as a hard penis.

Appellant in his defense, claimed that on January 1, 2010, noontime, he was not in the place where the crime happened for he was on a trip going to Batangas. The RTC gave credence to AAA’s testimony since she was a child of tender years. Moreover, the testimony was delivered in a spontaneous and straightforward manner. On the other hand, appellant’s defense of denial and alibi was left unsubstantiated by evidence. The RTC noted that Bansud is not too far from Banus. In light of the credible testimony and positive identification of the appellant, by AAA and appellant’s unsubstantiated defense, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed RTC’s decision with modification for the award of damages. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 

The Supreme Court stated that it has been held that when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Appellant’s defense of denial and alibi are inherently weak and self-serving, especially if uncorroborated. Denial cannot prevail over complainant’s direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Furthermore, the court is constrained to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Article 266-B provides that in cases of qualified statutory rape the penalty imposed shall be death. 

However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9346 instead prescribes that the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole be imposed in cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or the sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua. 

Dungo v People (2015)

DANDY DUNGO and GREGORIO SIBAL, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015

Facts:

On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna, the Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers conducted initiation rite. MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte was subjected to physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.

RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not herein accused were guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.

Ruling:
Yes, they are guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and 

3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

Classes of direct participants are: the first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing. The third class of principals would be the officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend the hazing. The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser. The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or organization.

Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein. 

(SOURCE: PALS 2016, Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin and the students of Polytechnic University of the Philippines)

People v Broniola (2015)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE BRONIOLA @ "ASOT"
G.R. No. 211027 June 29, 2015

Facts:
AAA, a Grade VI pupil, left her house for school in the morning of February 28, 2000. She did not return home that day. Her lifeless body was found on February 29, 2000 in a grassy lot near an uninhabited farm hut at Cotabato. The accused, armed with a bolo (Lagaraw), had a carnal knowledge with [AAA], minor, 13 years old, against her will, that after the occasion, accused with intent to kill, attack, assault, hack and use physical violence to the victim, thus inflicting upon her hack wounds on the different parts of her body, which is the direct and proximate cause of her death.

Issue: 
Whether or not, Abag, the accused, is guilty of rape with homicide

Ruling:
The felony of rape with homicide is a special complex crime that is, two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. In rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: 
(1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; 
(2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and 
(3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed the woman. 

Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. As the Court held in People v. Pascua: It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, the Court has held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally not witnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. 

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules of Evidence, as amended, sets forth the requirements of circumstantial evidence that is sufficient for conviction, viz:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

As regards the penalty imposed, R.A. No. 8353 provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. 

On the other hand, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9346 or "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" provides:

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

Furthermore, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides, "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." 

(SOURCE: PALS 2016, Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin and the students of Polytechnic University of the Philippines)

People v Miranda (2015)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO
GR. No. 209338 June 29, 2015

Facts:

The appellant was charged with crimes of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal sale and possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. He was arrested by the police officer through a buy-bust operation. The appellant denied the offenses charged and gave a different version of story.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of shabu. Ruling:
Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs if the following elements are present:

1. the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
   
2. the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto.
   The prosecution duly established the identity of the buyer and the seller, appellant being the seller and P/CI Chica as the poseur-buyer. The object of the transaction was a sachet of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 

As to the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore, P/CI Chica categorically testified that he caught appellant in flagrante delicto selling and delivering the shabu during a buy-bust operation.
It bears stressing that the sale of the illegal drugs in this case was brought about by a buy- bust operation – a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing criminals.

In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, the elements are:

1. the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
   
2. suchpossessionisnotauthorizedbylaw;and
   
3. the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
   
   These elements are also present in this case. P/CI Chica testified that after the appellant sold him shabu, another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance was recovered by Chairman Cruz from appellant at the time of his arrest. This too was submitted to the crime laboratory for analysis, and was positively found to contain shabu. 

(SOURCE: PALS 2016, Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin and the students of Polytechnic University of the Philippines)

Dinamling v People (2015)

RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 19952 June 22, 2015

Facts:
Petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two criminal information for violation of R.A. No. 9262. It is alleged in the information that he feloniously inflicts psychological violence upon a woman with whom he has two children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public humiliation by repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting utterance directed against the victim. Dinamling pleaded not guilty to both charges.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of RA No. 9262. 

Ruling:
The elements of the crime are;

(1)  The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children
(2)  The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode.
(3)  The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4)  The anguish is caused through the acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar acts or omissions.

In this case, the elements have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that thevictim is a woman who has then in a five-year ongoing relationship with Dinamling and had two common children. The woman is often in fear of petitioner due to latter’s physical and verbal abuse.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (RA No. 9262) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. It is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as the element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present a testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.

In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in the victim’s public ridicule. Accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or emotional well-being. 

(SOURCE: PALS 2016, Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin and the students of Polytechnic University of the Philippines)

People v Rayos (2015)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS (EN BANC)
G.R. No. 200942 June 16, 2015

Facts:

On April 2, 2003, Buensuceso, the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay City, was on his way back to the company staff house on board his Isuzu pick-up after attending a despedida for one of his employees. When he was about to enter the gate of the staff house, he was gunned down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on duty, David Azucena, who was then opening the gate identified one of the assailants as herein appellant. During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken during the preliminary investigation of the case, admitting the killing of Buensuceso.

However, when it was appellant’s turn to testify, he narrated that at the time of the killing, he was at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law. The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA found no reason to depart from the trial court’s findings.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

Yes, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Revised Penal Code provides the elements of murder, to wit: 
(1) Person was killed; 
(2) Accused killed him; 
(3) Killing attended by any of the following qualifying circumstances – 
(b) in consideration of a price, reward or promise.

In the present case, the Court held that appellant’s contention that he lacked legal intervention and assistance during the taking of his extrajudicial confession was totally belied by the testimony of Atty. Dumlao that he rendered assistance to the appellant throughout the entire proceedings and carefully explained to the latter the consequences of his admission. He informed appellant of his rights and that anything he says may be used in evidence against him. Appellant then proceeded to narrate that he was hired by Laranjo and Canadilla, for and in behalf of a certain Alonzo who owns a quarry in San Isidro, Valencia, to kill the victim for a fee. Appellant then narrated how he met with Laranjo, Canadilla and Alonzo; how he received payments and instructions; how he planned the killing; and how he executed the plan. Appellant insisted on giving his extrajudicial confession.

Notwithstanding, it must be stressed that appellant’s conviction was not based solely on his extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness account of Azucena who testified that immediately after hearing gunshots, he saw appellant about five meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of the victim. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a black motorcycle and was holding a gun. The ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs found at the crime scene were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from the appellant. Moreover, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.

Hence, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 

(SOURCE: PALS 2016, Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin and the students of Polytechnic University of the Philippines)

People v Nuyok (2015)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUDY NUYOK
G.R. No. 195424 June 15, 2015

Facts:

The victim was 13 years old when the accused committed the rapes in June, July, August and September of 2005. She resided in the house of her grandmother wherein the accused, her
paternal uncle, also lived. On June 25, 2005, as the victim was about to sleep, the accused laid down beside her. She tried to escape, but he pulled her by the hair, slapped her, and punched her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness, she noticed that her panties had blood. The accused warned her not to reveal the incident to anyone, threatening to kill her and her family if she did so. The victim finally reported the four rapes to her mother in October 2005. The accused denied having raped and imputed ill motives to the victim insisting that the victim’s mother had wanted to get back at him after he had told his brother, the victim’s father, that he had caught the victim’s mother with a paramour. Both the RTC and CA found the accused guilty of four counts of rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the minority of the offended party when the same was not indicated in the information.

Ruling:

No, the court a quo did not gravely err in appreciating the minority of the offended party.
The Revised Penal Code provides that Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 
(a) through force, threat, or intimidation; 
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; 
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; 
(d) When the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances above be present.

The failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso facto render the information defective. Neither the date nor the time of the commission of rape is a material ingredient of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of a female against her will through force or intimidation. Consequently, the date or the time of the commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. Secondly, the Prosecution successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt the charges of rape against the accused. The victim positively identified the accused as her rapist. Her account of his crimes was candid, and her demeanor revealing. She could not control herself but cried in the course of her testimony whenever she was made to recall her traumatic experiences at his hands. The testimony of a rape victim that is consistent with the medical findings constitutes sufficient basis to conclude that carnal knowledge occurred.

Hence, the court a quo did not gravely err in appreciating the minority of the offended party. 

(SOURCE: PALS 2016, Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin and the students of Polytechnic University of the Philippines)

Ocampo v People (2015)

PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO y SANTOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 
G.R. No. 194129 June 15, 2015

Facts:

On May 27, 2000, petitioner assaulted and use personal violence upon Mario De Luna. Petitioner fired his service firearm against the victim hitting the latter on the chest and other parts of the body. The wounds were the direct and immediate cause of his death. Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He admitted to having shot the victim to death, but claimed to have done so in self-defense. In support of this claim, defense witness Marita averred that the shooting incident was precipitated by the victim’s unprovoked knife attack upon accused-appellant. The Regional Trial Court convicted petitioner of homicide and upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but modified some of the monetary damages awarded.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Settled is the rule that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must be met:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and 
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person engaged in self-defense.

In this case, petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the first element of self-defense. There was no showing of attack or assault that had placed petitioner’s life in imminent or actual danger. Petitioner’s tale of self-defense is negated by the physical evidence, specifically the trajectory of the bullets that penetrated the victim’s body. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the physical evidence must be upheld.
With regard to the second element of self-defense, the Court finds that the means employed by petitioner was grossly disproportionate to the victim's alleged unlawful aggression. The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in his chest and different parts of his body. Indeed, the Advance Information prepared by the investigator of the case reveals that there was no mention of either a stabbing incident that happened or a knife that was recovered from the crime scene. Here, the wounds sustained by the victim clearly show the intent of petitioner to kill and not merely to prevent or repel an attack.

Hence, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 

(SOURCE: PALS 2016, Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin and the students of Polytechnic University of the Philippines)

Bartolome v Social Security System (2014)

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents. 
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

DOCTRINE: 
In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

FACTS: 
John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).

Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits with the SSS. 

However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victim’s great grandfather, therefore Bernardina cannot be considered as John’s beneficiary because she is not the deceased’s legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however, already died on October 26, 1987, less than three years since the decree of John’s adoption became final.

ISSUE: 
Do the biological parents of the covered qualify as the deceased’s dependent parent and, thus, entitled to the death benefits?

HELD: 
YES. when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx 

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child. 

SOURCE: PALS 2016 (Prepared by: Dean Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis and the students of Lyceum of the Philippines University)

MCMP Construction Corp. v Monark Equipment Corp. (2014)

MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP., Petitioner, vs. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP., Respondent. G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014

DOCTRINE: 
In a suit for the collection of money, the judge may equitably reduce the penalty when the debtor has partly or irregularly complied with the principal obligation. Further, even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.

FACTS: 
Monark Equipment Corp. (respondent Monark) leased 5 pieces of heavy equipment to MCMP Construction Corporation (petitioner MCMP) covered by a Rental Equipment Contract.
In the invoice, it states that the customer agrees to the following: a) that the credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date of invoice, b) to pay interest at 24% p.a. on all amounts, c) to the collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and 2% per month penalty charge for late payment on amounts overdue d) to pay a sum equal to 25% of any amount due as attorney’s fees in case of suit, and expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila, Metro Manila, for any legal action arising from, this transactions.

MCMP however failed to pay all the rental fees. Upon demands by Monark, MCMP was only able to pay P100,000.00 on April 15, 2001 and PhP100,000.00 on August 15, 2001. Further demands went unheeded. As of April 30, 2002, MCMP owed Monark the amount of PhP1,282,481.83.

On June 18, 2002, Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money, the RTC issued a Decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering MCMP to pay 1,282,481.83, as well as the 25% of the amount and the costs of suit.

ISSUE: 
Can the Court reduce the penalty charges imposed?

HELD: 
YES. The trial court imposed upon MCMP a 24% per annum interest on the rental fees as well as a collection fee of 1% per month compounded monthly and a 2% per month penalty charge. In all, the effective interest rate foisted upon MCMP is 60% per annum. On top of this, MCMP was assessed for attorney’s fees at the rate of 25% of the total amount due. The Court finds these exorbitant and unconscionable rates.

Article 1229 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. In exercising this power to determine what is iniquitous and unconscionable, courts must consider the circumstances of each case since what may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one may be totally just and equitable in another."

Also, respondent promised to pay 25% of his outstanding obligations as attorney’s fees in case of non-payment thereof. Attorney’s fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages. As long as said stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon respondent. Nonetheless, courts are empowered to reduce such rate if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable pursuant to the above-quoted provision. This sentiment is echoed in Article 2227 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. 

Following the above provisions, the interest and penalty charges as well as the stipulated attorney’s fees and the collection charge must all be reduced by the Court.
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to pay the former:
1. PhP 765,380.33 representing the unpaid rental fees;
2. Interest of 12% per annum on the unpaid rental fees to be computed from March 1, 200117 until payment;
3. Penalty and collection charge of 6% per annum on the unpaid rental fees to be computed from March 1, 2001;
4. Attorney's Fees of five percent (5%) of the total amount to be recovered; and,
5. The costs of suit. 

SOURCE: PALS 2016 (Prepared by: Dean Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis and the students of Lyceum of the Philippines University)

Quintos v Nicolas (2014)

VILMA QUINTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACTS FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR., ET AL. VS. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, ET AL. 
G.R. No. 210252. June 16, 2014

FACTS: Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by TCT No. 318717.

The deceased parents left their 10 children ownership over the subject property. In 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52 and was raffled to the RTC at Camiling, Tarlac but was later on dismissed as neither of the parties appeared and appealed.

Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of the 10 siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and TCT No. 390484 was issued in the names of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses. The siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale and Agreement of Subdivision, and the title was partially cancelled as a result.

Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein they alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in favor of their 10 children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They had been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over 4 decades and are allegedly entitled to equitable title. Participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deeds was denied.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share, which is an admission petitioners’ part that the property is not entirely theirs. The Ibarras allegedly mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property. Not having been repaid, the Candelarios accepted their share in the subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.

RTC: dismissed petitioners’ complaint, as it did not find merit in petitioners’ asseverations that they have acquired title over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted there was no document evidencing that their parents bequeathed the property. Subsequent transfer of the siblings’ interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was upheld.

CA: upheld lower court decision and held that since the property is co-owned by the plaintiffs- appellants, ( 3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (7/10 undivided interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey building at the back portion of the property, partition is in order, in accord with the subdivision plan.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches
or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the partition of the property.

HELD: PETITION IS PARTLY MERITORIOUS.

Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. 

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: 
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and 
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not petitioners sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue that is generally improper for Us to delve into.In any event, a perusal of the records would readily show that petitioners, as aptly observed by the courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim. Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners. Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s claim.

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Regrettably, petitioners failed to discharge the said burden. There is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and respondent spouses became co-owners of the same.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment.

As to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their counterclaim, the petitioners countered that the action for partition has already been barred by res judicata.

The Court had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. It is understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. This is pertinent to Article 494 of the Civil Code which discusses how the law generally does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners’ specific shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.

This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co- ownership does not or no longer exists.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches. We now proceed to petitioners’ second line of attack. According to petitioners, the claim for partition is already barred by laches since by 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and yet the respondent siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in 2002. And since laches has allegedly already set in against respondent siblings, so too should respondent spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the same for they could not have acquired a better right than their predecessors-in-interest.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which––by the exercise of due diligence––could or should have been done earlier. It is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. The principle is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the petitioners’ title, but only with whether or not by reason of the respondents’ long inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to do so would be inequitable and unjust to petitioners.

As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected to assert their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have abandoned their right given that they filed an action for partition. The fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract of Lease with Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject property is evidence that they are exercising rights of ownership over the same.

The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision. There is merit, however, in petitioners’ contention that the CA erred in approving the proposal for partition submitted by respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that partition shall either be by agreement of the parties or in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition for respondents admitted that the agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same. The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to approve the agreement in spite of this fact would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to divide unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on their own whims and caprices. 

SOURCE: PALS 2016 (Prepared by: Dean Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis and the students of Lyceum of the Philippines University)

Rebusquillo v Domingo (2014)

AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners, vs. SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, Respondents. 
G.R. No. 204029, June 4, 2014

Doctrine: 
An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement. (Art. 1346, NCC)

Facts: 
Petitioner was one of the seven children of deceased, Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal. Both of them died intestate. The deceased left a parcel of land in Legazpi City. In 2001, respondent Emelinda (daughter of petitioner), made petitioner sign two documents. In 2003, the petitioner discovered that the two documents were an affidavit of self-adjudication, and a deed of absolute sale in favor of the respondent spouses. Petitioner then filed an action to annul the two documents before the RTC. In the respondents’ answer, they admitted the execution of the affidavit and deed, but they argued that it was with the consent of all the heirs of Eulalio and Victoria, and that such was agreed to be done to facilitate the titling of the property. Respondents further argued that the petitioner received the amount of Php 50,000 for the sale.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and said that the affidavit and the sale were valid.

Issue: 
Whether or not the affidavit of self-adjudication and the sale are valid

Held: 
No. The petition is granted. Both the affidavit and the deed of sale are void.

Ratio: 
An Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. (Sec. 1, Rule 74, ROC). As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of representation of his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is the only daughter and sole heir of spouses Eulalio and Victoria. The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid.

In effect, Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self- Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.

The Civil Code provides: 
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.

In the present case, respondents admitted that the purpose of the sale was to facilitate titling and not the transfer of ownership. 

SOURCE: PALS 2016 (Prepared by: Dean Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis and the students of Lyceum of the Philippines University)