G.R. No. L-26816 February 28, 1967
PABLO DE JESUS, ENGRACIA DE JESUS and MANUELA DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, Branch I THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., MAXIMA DE Jesus and SALVADOR BARRIOS, respondents.
Feria, Feria, Lugto & La'O for petitioners. Salvador Barrios for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Ten persons,2 among whom are petitioners and respondent, Maxima de Jesus, are co-owners of six (6) parcels of land running along España P. Campa and Adelina Streets in Sampaloc, Manila. Administratrix thereof and co-owners attorney-in-fact is Maxima de Jesus. Her stipulated compensation is 10% of the rentals.
Lessee of the property is Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. The original lease contract was dated August 23 and 29, 1953. This lease was renewed by instrument executed on January 10, 1966, where under, through the efforts of Maxima de Jesus, the monthly rentals were increased from P850.00 to P3,500.00 during the first ten (10) years and to P4,000.00 for the subsequent five (5) years. Shell pays the rentals by
PABLO DE JESUS, ENGRACIA DE JESUS and MANUELA DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, Branch I THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., MAXIMA DE Jesus and SALVADOR BARRIOS, respondents.
Feria, Feria, Lugto & La'O for petitioners. Salvador Barrios for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Ten persons,2 among whom are petitioners and respondent, Maxima de Jesus, are co-owners of six (6) parcels of land running along España P. Campa and Adelina Streets in Sampaloc, Manila. Administratrix thereof and co-owners attorney-in-fact is Maxima de Jesus. Her stipulated compensation is 10% of the rentals.
Lessee of the property is Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. The original lease contract was dated August 23 and 29, 1953. This lease was renewed by instrument executed on January 10, 1966, where under, through the efforts of Maxima de Jesus, the monthly rentals were increased from P850.00 to P3,500.00 during the first ten (10) years and to P4,000.00 for the subsequent five (5) years. Shell pays the rentals by
issuing a check for P3,500.00 in the name of Maxima de Jesus who, in turn,
distributes the shares of her co-owners.
in October, 1966 — so the complaint further avers — sought to unjustly deprive Maxima de Jesus of her 10% compensation. And, to fraudulently escape such obligation, they surreptitiously instructed Shell not to pay their share in the rentals through said Maxima de Jesus but directly to them.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
*CITY COURT:
Upon the foregoing complaint filed on October 3, 1966, the respondent judge of the city court, on a P500.00-bond, issued ex-parte, on October 4, 1966, a writ of preliminary injunction.
This is a special action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Pablo, Engracia and Manuela de Jesus.
ISSUES & RULING:
1. two jurisdictional issues: first, jurisdiction over the subject matter;
NO. The City court has no jurisdiction. The subject matter of the litigation is "specific performance" and IS NOT CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION -- therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of first instance.
A careful and considerate examination of the complaint below as a whole brings to the fore the fact that plaintiff Maxima de Jesus asks that these defendants comply faithfully with their respective commitments. Implicit, too, in the complaint is the demand that her said co-owners recognize her as administratrix. It is in the context just recited that plaintiff's action below comes within the concept of specific performance of contract. And in this posture, we express the view that jurisdiction resides in the court of first instance. For, specific performance — the subject of the litigation — "is not capable of pecuniary estimation".
An action for specific performance is not capable of pecuniary estimation even if there is payment or prayer for damages and attorney's fees because payment would be but an incident or consequence of defendant's liability for specific performance. If no such liability is judicially declared, the payment can not be awarded.
There is an unqualified refusal to perform the contract. Such refusal goes to the entire contract. It is treated as a complete breach.
2. and second, the power of the City Court of Manila to issue a writ of preliminary or final injunction
NO.
First, we have ruled that the city court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; in consequence, it is powerless to grant an ancillary remedy therein.
The strong point on which respondents herein root their argument is Section 2 of Rule 58, which reads:
in October, 1966 — so the complaint further avers — sought to unjustly deprive Maxima de Jesus of her 10% compensation. And, to fraudulently escape such obligation, they surreptitiously instructed Shell not to pay their share in the rentals through said Maxima de Jesus but directly to them.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
*CITY COURT:
Upon the foregoing complaint filed on October 3, 1966, the respondent judge of the city court, on a P500.00-bond, issued ex-parte, on October 4, 1966, a writ of preliminary injunction.
This is a special action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Pablo, Engracia and Manuela de Jesus.
ISSUES & RULING:
1. two jurisdictional issues: first, jurisdiction over the subject matter;
NO. The City court has no jurisdiction. The subject matter of the litigation is "specific performance" and IS NOT CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION -- therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of first instance.
A careful and considerate examination of the complaint below as a whole brings to the fore the fact that plaintiff Maxima de Jesus asks that these defendants comply faithfully with their respective commitments. Implicit, too, in the complaint is the demand that her said co-owners recognize her as administratrix. It is in the context just recited that plaintiff's action below comes within the concept of specific performance of contract. And in this posture, we express the view that jurisdiction resides in the court of first instance. For, specific performance — the subject of the litigation — "is not capable of pecuniary estimation".
An action for specific performance is not capable of pecuniary estimation even if there is payment or prayer for damages and attorney's fees because payment would be but an incident or consequence of defendant's liability for specific performance. If no such liability is judicially declared, the payment can not be awarded.
There is an unqualified refusal to perform the contract. Such refusal goes to the entire contract. It is treated as a complete breach.
2. and second, the power of the City Court of Manila to issue a writ of preliminary or final injunction
NO.
First, we have ruled that the city court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; in consequence, it is powerless to grant an ancillary remedy therein.
The strong point on which respondents herein root their argument is Section 2 of Rule 58, which reads:
SEC. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be
granted by the judge of any court in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the
Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a
Court of First Instance in any action pending in an inferior court within his district.
They place the accent on the phrase "any court in which the action is pending." Argue respondents: Since the case is pending in the city court, it has jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunction. This ratiocination suffers from infirmities.
First, we have ruled that the city court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; in consequence, it is powerless to grant an ancillary remedy therein.
Second, the first sentence of Section 2 should be read in context. The last sentence of the quoted statute, namely, that injunction "may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any action pending in an inferior court within his district", emphasizes the point that the city court, except in the cases where it is specifically authorized by statute, cannot grant preliminary injunction.
Third, as adverted to elsewhere in this opinion, absent an explicit and precise grant of jurisdiction in the city court, no amount of expensive construction would give such court that jurisdiction. At any rate, the party plaintiff is not without speedy remedy. He may seek injunctive assistance from the court of first instance.
But let us assume that what plaintiff below claims, as against her co-owners, is but a judgment for the small sum of P185.08, her compensation for the month of October, 1966. Nonetheless, the city court remains without jurisdiction. This is because the sum of money action may not be divorced from the injunction suit. Both of them are the subject of only one complaint.
DISPOSITIVE:
The city court was ordered to dismiss the case.
* jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.4 Constitutionally viewed, apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in Congress. Congress may not delegate that power.
* A rule, the validity of which is recognized, is that jurisdiction of an inferior court will not be presumed; "it must appear clearly from statute or it will not be held to exist." Such jurisdiction cannot be broadened upon "doubtful inferences" drawn from statutes. Absent a statutory grant, neither convenience nor assumed justice or propriety of the exercise thereof in a particular class of cases "can justify the assumption of jurisdiction" by said courts.
* the averments of the complaint, taken as a whole, are what determine the nature of the action, and therefore, the court's jurisdiction
They place the accent on the phrase "any court in which the action is pending." Argue respondents: Since the case is pending in the city court, it has jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunction. This ratiocination suffers from infirmities.
First, we have ruled that the city court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; in consequence, it is powerless to grant an ancillary remedy therein.
Second, the first sentence of Section 2 should be read in context. The last sentence of the quoted statute, namely, that injunction "may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any action pending in an inferior court within his district", emphasizes the point that the city court, except in the cases where it is specifically authorized by statute, cannot grant preliminary injunction.
Third, as adverted to elsewhere in this opinion, absent an explicit and precise grant of jurisdiction in the city court, no amount of expensive construction would give such court that jurisdiction. At any rate, the party plaintiff is not without speedy remedy. He may seek injunctive assistance from the court of first instance.
But let us assume that what plaintiff below claims, as against her co-owners, is but a judgment for the small sum of P185.08, her compensation for the month of October, 1966. Nonetheless, the city court remains without jurisdiction. This is because the sum of money action may not be divorced from the injunction suit. Both of them are the subject of only one complaint.
DISPOSITIVE:
The city court was ordered to dismiss the case.
* jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.4 Constitutionally viewed, apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in Congress. Congress may not delegate that power.
* A rule, the validity of which is recognized, is that jurisdiction of an inferior court will not be presumed; "it must appear clearly from statute or it will not be held to exist." Such jurisdiction cannot be broadened upon "doubtful inferences" drawn from statutes. Absent a statutory grant, neither convenience nor assumed justice or propriety of the exercise thereof in a particular class of cases "can justify the assumption of jurisdiction" by said courts.
* the averments of the complaint, taken as a whole, are what determine the nature of the action, and therefore, the court's jurisdiction
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