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These are all original case digests or case briefs done while the author was studying law school in the Philippines.

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Sunday, April 13, 2014

People v Sunga (Criminal Procedure)

People v Sunga 
G.R. No. 126029 
March 27, 2003  

FACTS:  

That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said rape and to enable them to conceal the commission of the crime, the herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy together with LOCIL CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage of their superior number and strength, with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of her death shortly thereafter.  

On October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness, averring therein that the legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with, and submitting her sworn statement which detailed how her co-accused carried out the crime.  

Her version of the facts is as follows:  

"At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan" from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in Puerto Princesa City. Already on board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark on the right side of the face and who invited Locil for a joy ride.13 Upon instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she did not know but whom she later identified and who answered to the name Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park.  

At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the victim, who was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with Jocelyn, then joined Locil aboard the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the meantime left. Still aboard the tricycle, the four of them proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held her and by Ramil Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her waist as they dragged her to a nearby "buho" clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty was taken off by Lansang. As she lay face up with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua, Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his penis into her vagina and "seemed to be pumping."  

After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as Lansang and one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter described as one who has "chinky" or "narrow eyes," later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her hands.  

Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along struggled against her malefactors.  

After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a sitting position and clutch her abdomen. Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to Lansang who smashed Jocelyn's head with an irregularly shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground lifeless. Locil, who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back into the tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride with them. All five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving Jocelyn's body behind.  

When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard the voice of someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep mum about the incident, otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil then repaired to her boarding house. Until she was arrested following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyn's corpse, she did not report the incident to anyone."  

Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.  

Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery with homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park. Through a sworn statement, he averred that: He, Octa and Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyn's corpse and dumped it at a coffee plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in the rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to Lansang's promise to give him P500.00.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape. While the others are acquitted and Locil is discharged as state witness.  

Automatic review by SC.  

ISSUES: (1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state witness is in accordance with law; and  

(2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt  

(3) Is Sunga's sworn statement admissible as evidence?  

HELD:  

The accused were acquitted.  

(1) NO.  

Requisites: 1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness; - YES  

2. his testimony is absolutely necessary; - YES  

Based on Locil's sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what happened to Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable.  

3. No other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except his testimony; - YES  

4. His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; - NO  

a. As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locil's testimony. The declarations of other witnesses can in no way enhance the veracity of the essential, material aspects of Locil's account for they relate --- not to the crime itself but to events THEREAFTER.  

An exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes of Locil's testimony reveals, however, that the manner by which she related it was punctuated with marks of tentativeness, uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to take note of in its decision on review.  

b. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she boarded a tricycle bearing a lesbian who invited her for a joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and picked up Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted with, then brought by the same tricycle to Irawan where the latter was raped and brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted to convey that she was deliberately brought by appellants with them on June 29, 1994 to the place where they were to carry out, which they did, their abominable acts against Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not bizarre.  

5. He does not appear to be the most guilty; and. - YES  

6. He has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. - -YES  

But -- Who can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being traced by her mother and aunt?  

(2) NO, see items 1 and 2.  

In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. 

In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants' alibi, the prosecution still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden, appellants' presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.  

(3) NO.  

From the testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty. Rocamora (Sunga's counse during custodial investigation) did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving his (Sunga's) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga.  

Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible.  

The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.  

RATIO:  

(1) The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness may suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and is full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought; otherwise, it needs corroboration the presence or lack of which may ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution and the fate of the accused.  

(2) The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest.  

a. Was Locil's testimony corroborated in its material points by the prosecution's other evidence? - NO  

b. If in the affirmative, was the corroborative evidence unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances to such an extent that Locil's trustworthiness becomes manifest? - NO  

In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. [This was not present in this case]  

NOTES:  

(1) Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. 


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