People v CFI Quezon (Natural resources)

PEOPLE V CFI QUEZON 

G.R. No. L-46772 

February 13, 1992  

FACTS: 

on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality of General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.  

Contrary to Law.  

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, towit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * Trial court: dismissed the information on the grounds invoked.  

Then, directly to the Supreme Court.  

ISSUES & RULINGS:  

(1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and  

YES.  

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.  

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.  

The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands.  

While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.  

(2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.  

YES. [NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases requires complaint to be filed first with the DENR]  

With the exception of the so-called "private crimes" 1 and in election offenses, 2 prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations. In both cases under said Sec. 80 namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for offenses committed in his presence); or 2) after conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of violations of the decree (for violations not committed in his presence) — he is still required to file the proper complaint with the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations in court. Said section should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations regarding offenses described in the decree rather, it should be construed as granting forest officers and employees special authority to arrest and investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such authority by those upon whom it is vested by general law.  

Merida v People (Natural Resources)

MERIDA V PEOPLE (DEFINITION OF TIMBER, AUTHORITY OF FOREST OFFICERS) 

G.R. No. 158182 

June 12, 2008  

FACTS:  

on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998, 7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's wife.  

On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 

* DENR forester: ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.  

On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber, 9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter.  

* RTC (upon complaint of Tansiongco): Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.  

* CA: affirmed trial court.  

ISSUES & RULINGS:  

1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and  

YES, DENR has jurisdiction. 

[NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases requires complaint to be filed first with the DENR, but the preliminary investigation is done by the prosecutor]  

Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:  

SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x  

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.  

If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)  

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."  

At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction. 

2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.  

YES.  

Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him.  

3) Is the narra tree timber?  

YES.  

The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."  

In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions or certain "stand age" or "rotation age." In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber,"  

We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery." Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.  

Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

People v Sunga (Criminal Procedure)

People v Sunga 

G.R. No. 126029 

March 27, 2003  

FACTS:  

That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said rape and to enable them to conceal the commission of the crime, the herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy together with LOCIL CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage of their superior number and strength, with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of her death shortly thereafter.  

On October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness, averring therein that the legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with, and submitting her sworn statement which detailed how her co-accused carried out the crime.  

Her version of the facts is as follows:  

"At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan" from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in Puerto Princesa City. Already on board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark on the right side of the face and who invited Locil for a joy ride.13 Upon instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she did not know but whom she later identified and who answered to the name Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park.  

At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the victim, who was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with Jocelyn, then joined Locil aboard the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the meantime left. Still aboard the tricycle, the four of them proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held her and by Ramil Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her waist as they dragged her to a nearby "buho" clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty was taken off by Lansang. As she lay face up with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua, Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his penis into her vagina and "seemed to be pumping."  

After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as Lansang and one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter described as one who has "chinky" or "narrow eyes," later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her hands.  

Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along struggled against her malefactors.  

After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a sitting position and clutch her abdomen. Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to Lansang who smashed Jocelyn's head with an irregularly shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground lifeless. Locil, who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back into the tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride with them. All five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving Jocelyn's body behind.  

When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard the voice of someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep mum about the incident, otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil then repaired to her boarding house. Until she was arrested following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyn's corpse, she did not report the incident to anyone."  

Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.  

Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery with homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park. Through a sworn statement, he averred that: He, Octa and Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyn's corpse and dumped it at a coffee plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in the rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to Lansang's promise to give him P500.00.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape. While the others are acquitted and Locil is discharged as state witness.  

Automatic review by SC.  

ISSUES: (1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state witness is in accordance with law; and  

(2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt  

(3) Is Sunga's sworn statement admissible as evidence?  

HELD:  

The accused were acquitted.  

(1) NO.  

Requisites: 1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness; - YES  

2. his testimony is absolutely necessary; - YES  

Based on Locil's sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what happened to Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable.  

3. No other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except his testimony; - YES  

4. His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; - NO  

a. As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locil's testimony. The declarations of other witnesses can in no way enhance the veracity of the essential, material aspects of Locil's account for they relate --- not to the crime itself but to events THEREAFTER.  

An exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes of Locil's testimony reveals, however, that the manner by which she related it was punctuated with marks of tentativeness, uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to take note of in its decision on review.  

b. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she boarded a tricycle bearing a lesbian who invited her for a joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and picked up Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted with, then brought by the same tricycle to Irawan where the latter was raped and brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted to convey that she was deliberately brought by appellants with them on June 29, 1994 to the place where they were to carry out, which they did, their abominable acts against Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not bizarre.  

5. He does not appear to be the most guilty; and. - YES  

6. He has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. - -YES  

But -- Who can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being traced by her mother and aunt?  

(2) NO, see items 1 and 2.  

In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. 

In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants' alibi, the prosecution still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden, appellants' presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.  

(3) NO.  

From the testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty. Rocamora (Sunga's counse during custodial investigation) did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving his (Sunga's) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga.  

Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible.  

The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.  

RATIO:  

(1) The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness may suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and is full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought; otherwise, it needs corroboration the presence or lack of which may ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution and the fate of the accused.  

(2) The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest.  

a. Was Locil's testimony corroborated in its material points by the prosecution's other evidence? - NO  

b. If in the affirmative, was the corroborative evidence unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances to such an extent that Locil's trustworthiness becomes manifest? - NO  

In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. [This was not present in this case]  

NOTES:  

(1) Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. 

People v Dansico (Criminal Procedure)

People v Dansico 

G.R. No. 178060 

February 23, 2011  

FACTS:  

"That sometime on September 7, 1998 at about 4:30 o'clock  [sic] in the afternoon, at Brgy. May-  

Anao, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROMEO DANSICO y MONAY a.k.a. “Lamyak” and AUGUSTO CUADRA y ENRIQUEZ conspiring, confederating and helping one another to attain a common purpose did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously without authority of law sell, deliver one (1) pc. Marijuana bricks wrapped in newspaper with approximate size of 1 ½ x 8 x 10 inches weighing approximately NINE HUNDRED (900) grams for and in consideration of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) to the prejudice of the Government."  

ISSUE:  

Are the accused guilty of the crime?  

Sub-issues:  

a. Were the two (2) elements of the crime – the sale and delivery of the marijuana, and the knowledge of the sale of marijuana – properly established in evidence?  

b. Was the evidence able to establish the existence of the buy-bust operation?  

c. Are the defenses of denial and frame-up, and the claim of police extortion raised by the appellants valid? should they be considered?  

d. Were the accused instigated to sell marijuana?  

HELD:  

They are guilty.  

a. YES - the two elements were properly established in evidence.  

To convict an accused of illegal sale of marijuana, the prosecution must establish these essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.  

The fact that an actual buy-bust operation took place involving the appellants is supported not only by the testimonies of Paz  (as the poseur-buyer) and P/Insp. Vargas, but also by the presented documentary evidence consisting of (a) the photocopy of the serial numbers of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, (b) the Tigaon Police Station police blotter showing the arrest of the appellants on September 7, 1998 and the cause of their arrest by the group of P/Insp. Vargas, (c) the booking sheet and arrest report against the appellants prepared by P/Insp. Vargas, and (d) the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by P/Insp. Vargas and Eduardo Buenavente, another civilian volunteer.  

b. YES.  

The testimonies of Paz and P/Insp. Vargas on the buy-bust operation and the identities of the appellants as the sellers of the marijuana were positive and straightforward; they were consistent with one another with respect to the events that transpired before, during, and after the buy-bust operation that led to the appellants' arrest.  

c. NO  

the defenses of denial, frame-up, and police extortion only become weighty when inconsistencies and improbabilities cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution evidence. We do not see these inconsistencies and improbabilities in the presented evidence. 

d. NO.  

Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to commit, in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a lawbreaker.  

Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent to commit an offense originated from the inducer and not the accused who had no intention to commit the crime and would not have committed it were it not for the initiatives by the inducer. In entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused; the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes.  

In instigation, the law enforcers act as active co-principals.  Instigation leads to the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment does not bar prosecution and conviction.  

NOTES: 

(1) In buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.