People v CFI Quezon (Natural resources)

PEOPLE V CFI QUEZON 

G.R. No. L-46772 

February 13, 1992  

FACTS: 

on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality of General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.  

Contrary to Law.  

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, towit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * Trial court: dismissed the information on the grounds invoked.  

Then, directly to the Supreme Court.  

ISSUES & RULINGS:  

(1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and  

YES.  

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.  

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.  

The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands.  

While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.  

(2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.  

YES. [NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases requires complaint to be filed first with the DENR]  

With the exception of the so-called "private crimes" 1 and in election offenses, 2 prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations. In both cases under said Sec. 80 namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for offenses committed in his presence); or 2) after conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of violations of the decree (for violations not committed in his presence) — he is still required to file the proper complaint with the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations in court. Said section should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations regarding offenses described in the decree rather, it should be construed as granting forest officers and employees special authority to arrest and investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such authority by those upon whom it is vested by general law.  

Standard Mineral Products Inc. v CA (Natural Resources)

STANDARD MINERAL PRODUCTS, INC. v CA 

G.R. No. L-43277  

April 26, 1990  

FACTS:   

Petitioner-Appellant Standard Mineral Products, Inc. (SMPI, for short) claims that it is the locator of placer mining claims "Celia IV" and "Celia VI" containing limestone in Kaysipot, Antipolo, Rizal, which were duly registered in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Rizal on 1959.   

The Bureau of Mines held SMPI's application in abeyance pending submission of the permission of the surface owners. No agreement having been reached by the parties, on 20 December 1965, SMPI brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Respondents-Appellees praying that it be granted surface rights for mining purposes over fifteen (15) hectares of the Landowner's property and a right-of-way over a portion of five (5) hectares leading to and covered by the said mining claims.  

The Landowners traversed the Complaint, by averring that SMPI is not entitled to the relief demanded because the prospecting was accomplished without previously securing the Landowner's written permission as surface owners as required by Section 27 of the Mining Act (Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended).  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 

*Trial Court: sentenced SMPI to pay to Deeunhong and the Tanjuatcos actual damages in the sum of P50,000.00 each, attorney's fees of P5,000.00 and costs. 

*Appellate Court: affirmed that Decision with the sole modification that temperate or moderate damages (not actual damages) of P25,000.00 each were awarded instead. 

ISSUES & RULING: (1) whether or not SMPI is entitled to surface rights and a right of way to a 15-hectare portion of the Landowners' property covered by SMPI's mining claims for mining purposes.   

NO. SMPI is not entitled to said surface rights as it failed to comply with the requisite of prior written permission by the Landowners before entering the private land in question.  

Section 27 of the Mining Act explicitly provides:  

Section 27. Before entering private lands the prospector shall FIRST APPLY IN WRITING FOR WRITTEN PERMISSION of the private owner, claimant, or holder thereof, and in case of refusal by such private owner, claimant, or holder to grant such permission, or in case of disagreement as to the amount of compensation to be paid for such privilege of prospecting therein, the amount of such compensation shall be fixed by agreement among the prospector, the Director of the Bureau of Mines and the surface owner, and in case of their failure to unanimously agree as to the amount of compensation, all questions at issue shall be determined by the Court of First Instance of the province in which said lands are situated in an action instituted for the purpose by the prospector, or his principal: Provided, however, that the prospector, or his principal upon depositing with the court the sum considered jointly by him and the Director of the Bureau of Mines and the court to be just compensation for the damages resulting from such prospecting, shall be permitted to enter upon, and locate the said land without such written permission pending final adjudication of the amount of such compensation; and in such case the prospector, or his principal, shall have a prior right as against the world, from the date of his application. The court in its final judgment, besides determining the corresponding compensation of the damages which may be caused by the prospecting, shall make a pronouncement as to the value and the reasonable rental for the occupation and utilization thereof for mining purposes in case the prospector decides to locate and exploit the minerals found therein. (Emphasis ours).  

No one can dispute that under the Regalian doctrine, minerals found in one's land belong to the State and not to a private landowner (Section 8, Article XIV, 1973 Constitution; Sections 3 and 4, Mining Act). Nonetheless, a condition sine qua non is that the prospecting, exploration, discovery and location must be done in accordance with the law. As it is, SMPI's rights to use and exploit the mineral resources discovered and located never matured because of its omission to comply with a condition precedent. To allow SMPI its claim for surface rights and right of way would be to countenance illegal trespass into private property.  

(2) A corollary issue raised is whether or not the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had jurisdiction over the proceedings before them in the light of Section 61 of the Mining Act.  

YES.   

Section 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision; Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from receipt of such decision or order. In case any one of the parties should disagree with the decision or order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order, otherwise the said decision or order shall be final and binding upon the parties concerned. Findings of facts in the decision or order of the Director of Mines when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or parties desiring to appeal from such decision or order shall file in the Supreme Court a petition for review wherein only questions of law may be raised.  

Said provision is inapplicable, however, as it refers to "conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations," which is not the subject matter in the case at bar. The basic issue herein is SMPI's entitlement to surface rights and right of way. The dispute is not a mining conflict. It is essentially judicial. In SMPI's own words.   

The suit below was not merely for a determination of the amount to be paid for surface rights, as SMPI contends, inasmuch as the very validity of those surface rights was likewise squarely put in issue.  

Of significance, too, is the fact that SMPI filed its action with the Trial Court, actively participated in the hearings therein, but, it was only after a judgment adverse to it was rendered that it raised the issue of jurisdiction. It is now estopped, therefore, from impugning said jurisdiction.

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC) v VENERACION (Natural Resources)

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC) v VENERACION 

G.R. No. 129820             

November 30, 2006  

FACTS:   

This case involves the conflicting claims of the petitioner Philippine National Oil Corporation-Energy Development Corporation and the respondent over the mining rights over Block 159 of the Malangas Coal Reservation, Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:  

*RED of the DENR Office in Zamboanga City: ruled in favor of VENERACION and ordered the PNOC to amend its Mineral Production Sharing Agreement [MPSA] by excluding therefrom Block 159 *DENR secretary: dismissed the appeal on the ground that petitioner's right to appeal had already prescribed.Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463 provides therefore for a five-day reglementary period from the receipt of the order or decision of the Director. *DENR secretary (motion for reconsideration): reversed the Decision, dated 4 October 1994, and gave due course to the MPSA of the petitioner. *DENR secretary (2nd motion for reconsideration): ruled that the Orders issued by the RED have already become final and executory when the petitioner failed to file its appeal five days after it had received the Orders. *MAB (took cognizance pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act): filed its appeal beyond the five-day prescriptive period provided under Presidential Decree No. 463, which was then the governing law on the matter.  

ISSUES:  

(1) whether or not the petitioner has already lost its right to appeal the RED's Order dated 12 April 1993; and  

(2) whether or not the petitioner acquired a preferential right on mining rights over Block 159.  

HELD: *On propriety of appeal: The correct mode of appeal would have been to file a petition for review under Rule 43, before the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this Court has taken into account the fact that these cases [which provided the doctrine] were promulgated after the petitioner filed this appeal on 4 August 1997, and decided to take cognizance of the present case.  

(1) YES, the right to appeal is lost. Petitioner's insistence that the 30-day reglementary period provided by Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended, applies, cannot be sustained by this Court. By providing a five-day period within which to file an appeal on the decisions of the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences, Presidential Decree No. 463 unquestionably repealed Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137.  

Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. The right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.  

In the instant case, petitioner failed to state any compelling reason for not filing its appeal within the mandated period. Instead, the records show that after failing to comply with the period within which to file their motion for reconsideration on time, they again failed to file their appeal before the Office of the DENR Secretary within the time provided by law.  

(2) NO, Even if petitioner had not lost its right to appeal, it cannot claim any mining rights over Block 159 for failure to comply with the legal requirements.  

SEC. 15. Government Reserved Land. – Lands reserved by the Government for purposes other than mining are open to prospecting. Any interested party may file an application therefore with the head of the agency administering said land, subject always to compliance with pertinent laws and rules and regulations covering such reserved land. Such application shall be acted upon within thirty (30) days. In such cases, the compensation due the surface owner shall accrue equally to the agency administering the reserved land and the Bureau of Mines.  

The law enumerates the following requirements:  

(1) a prospecting permit from the agency that has jurisdiction over the area, in this case, the OEA;  

(2) an exploration permit from the BMGS; 

(3) if the exploration reveals the presence of commercial deposit, the permitee applies before the BMGS for the exclusion of the area from the reservation; 

(4) granting by the president of the application to exclude the area from the reservation; and  

(5) a mining agreement approved by the DENR Secretary.  

In this case, petitioner complied with the first requirement and obtained a prospecting permit from the OEA. In its correspondence with the petitioner, the OEA, however, advised the petitioner on two separate occasions to obtain a "prospecting permit" from the BMGS, although the OEA was probably referring to an exploration permit. The petitioner did not apply for an exploration permit with the BMGS, nor would the BMGS have granted petitioner an exploration permit because when petitioner wrote to the BMGS informing the latter of its intention to enter into an MPSA with the DENR over Block 159, the BMGS informed the petitioner that the respondent's claim over Block 159 had already preceded that of the petitioner. The advice given by the BMGS was justified since at that time, the respondent already had a pending application for the exclusion of Block 159 from the Malangas Coal Reservation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed his MPSA application, without complying with the second, third and fourth requisites. Since it ignored the sound advice of the OEA and the BMGS, the government agencies concerned, and stubbornly insisted on its incorrect procedure, petitioner cannot complain now that its MPSA was revoked for failure to comply with the legal requirements.  

OBITER DICTA: 

(1) Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have recognized a distinction between 

(1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative nature, such as "granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling applications, or deciding conflicting applications," and 

(2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.  

(2) Findings of fact by the Mines Adjudication Board, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the panel of arbitrators, shall be conclusive and binding on the parties, and its decision or order shall be final and executory. But resort to the appropriate court, through a petition for review by certiorari, involving questions of law, may be made within thirty days from the receipt of the order or decision of the Mines Adjudication Board.

BENGUET CORPORATION v DENR-MAB (Natural Resources)

BENGUET CORPORATION v DENR-MAB 

G.R. No. 163101 

February 13, 2008  

FACTS: 

On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a RAWOP, wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims respectively named as Bonito-I, Bonito-II, Bonito-III, and Bonito-IV, with a total area of 288.8656 hectares, situated in Barangay Luklukam, Sitio Bagong Bayan, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.  

Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims. However, on February 9, 1999, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP  on the following grounds:   

a.      The fact that your company has failed to perform the obligations set forth in the RAWOP, i.e., to undertake development works within 2 years from the execution of the Agreement;  b.      Violation of the Contract by allowing high graders to operate on our claim.  c.      No stipulation was provided with respect to the term limit of the RAWOP.  d.      Non-payment of the royalties thereon as provided in the RAWOP.  

On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP with the Legaspi City POA, Region V, docketed as DENR Case No. 2000-01 and entitled J.G. Realty v. Benguet.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: *POA: declared the RAWOP cancelled. *MAB: affirmed POA.  

ISSUES: (1) Should the controversy have first been submitted to arbitration before the POA took cognizance of the case?;  (2) Was the cancellation of the RAWOP supported by evidence?; and  (3) Did the cancellation of the RAWOP amount to unjust enrichment of J.G. Realty at the expense of Benguet?  

HELD: On correctness of appeal:  Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.  

(1) YES, the case should have first been brought to voluntary arbitration before the POA.  

Secs. 11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently provide:   

11.01 Arbitration              

Any disputes, differences or disagreements between BENGUET and the OWNER with reference to anything whatsoever pertaining to this Agreement that cannot be amicably settled by them shall not be cause of any action of any kind whatsoever in any court or administrative agency but shall, upon notice of one party to the other, be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to be selected by BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to be selected by the aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed.              

x x x x   

11.02  Court Action              

No action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute as hereinabove stated, except to enforce the decision of the majority of the Arbitrators   

A contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to voluntary arbitration before the parties can go directly to court is not illegal and is in fact promoted by the State.  

To reiterate, availment of voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or quasi-judicial agencies of the government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by the parties.   

In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of voluntary arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on motion of the defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such contractual provision for arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall then order the enforcement of said provision.  

In sum, on the issue of whether POA should have referred the case to voluntary arbitration, we find that, indeed, POA has no jurisdiction over the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the arbitration law.  

HOWEVER, ESTOPPEL APPLIES. the Court rules that the jurisdiction of POA and that of MAB can no longer be questioned by Benguet at this late hour. What Benguet should have done was to immediately challenge the POA's jurisdiction by a special civil action for certiorari when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute.  To redo the proceedings fully participated in by the parties after the lapse of seven years from date of institution of the original action with the POA would be anathema to the speedy and efficient administration of justice.  

(2) The cancellation of the RAWOP was supported by evidence. 

(3) There is no unjust enrichment in the instant case. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.  

The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two conditions:  (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and  (2) that such benefit is derived at another's expense or damage.  

Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation of the RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to participate in further developing the mining claims, was brought about by its violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its predicament.  

OBITER DICTA: 

(1) Difference between compulsory & voluntary arbitration --  

In Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC, compulsory arbitration has been defined both as “the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party.” While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor department's personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws.  

There is a clear distinction between compulsory and voluntary arbitration. The arbitration provided by the POA is compulsory, while the nature of the arbitration provision in the RAWOP is voluntary, not involving any government agency.