Planters Development Bank v Chandumal (Civil Procedure)

Planters Development Bank v Chandumal
GR No. 195619, September 5, 2012

FACTS:

BF Homes, Inc. and Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. BF Homes then sold to PDB all its rights and interests over the contract. On June 18, 1999, an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession was filed by PDP against Chandumal.

Consequently, summons was issued. According to the Sheriff's return, Sheriff Galing attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on three dates but it was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of summons by serving the same through Chandumal's mother who acknowledged receipt thereof.

For her failure to file within the prescribed period, PDB filed an ex parte motion to declare Chandumal in default which was granted by the RTC. On February 23, 2001, Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default maintaining that she did not receive the summons and/or was not notified of the same. RTC denied Chandumal's motion which was reversed by the Court of Appeals due to invalid and ineffective substituted service of summons.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons
(2) Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court
(3) Whether there was proper rescission by notarial act of the contract to sell

HELD:
(1) There was no valid substitute service of summons.

The Return of Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return merely states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.

(2) Respondent voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states "The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons"

(3) There is no valid rescission of the contract to sell by notarial act.

The allegation that Chandumal made herself unavailable for payment is not an excuse as the twin requirements for a valid and effective cancellation under the law, i.e. notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act and the full payment of the cash surrender value, is mandatory.

Masing & Sons Development Corporation (MSDC) v Rogelio (Labor Standards)

Masing & Sons Development Corporation (MSDC) v Rogelio 

GR No. 161787 

April 27, 2011  

FACTS:   

Rogelio is an employee of the Ibajay branch of MSDC, with Lim as Branch Manager. In 1991, he availed himself of the SSS retirement benefits, and in order to facilitate the grant of such benefits, he entered into an internal arrangement with Chan and MSDC to the effect that MSDC would issue a certification of his separation from employment notwithstanding that he would continue working as a laborer in the Ibajay branch but it was only on 1997 that Rogelio was paid his last salary but without retirement benefits, he was 67 years old at that time.  

Rogelio then filed the case for payment of his retirement benefits before the Labor Arbiter. MSDC defense is that they were not engaged in copra buying in Ibajay and they did not ever register in such business in any government agency and that Lim is an independent copra buyer.  

LA: dismissed. no employer-employee relationship between Rogelio & MSDC. NLRC: dismissed. no double retirement in the private sector. CA: granted. Rogelio is an employee of Chan and MSDC, benefits under RA 7641 is apart from the retirement benefits that a qualified employee could claim under the Social Security Law.  

Hence, Masing appealed to the Supreme Court.  

ISSUE:  WON Rogelio had remained the Company's employee from July 6, 1989 up to March 17, 1997; WON Rogelio is entitled to retirement benefits.  

HELD:  YES,  Rogelio is entitled to retirement benefits.  

Even if there is a Certification of Separation from Employment dated August 10, 1991, "... in light of the incontrovertible physical reality that petitioner and his co-workers did go to work day in and day out for such a long period of time, doing the same thing, and in the same place, without apparent discontinuity, except on paper, these documents cannot be taken at their face value."  

In case of doubt, the doubt is resolved in favor of labor, in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer as mandated by Article 1702 of the Civil Code. The reality of the petitioner's toil speaks louder than words.  

RATIO: 

(1) In any controversy between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence are resolved in favor of the laborer. 

(2) The beneficent provisions of Article 287 of the Labor Code, is apart from the retirement benefits that can be claimed by a qualified employee under the social security law. 

(3) The benefits was enacted as a labor protection measure and as a curative statute to respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor, can be extended not only from the date of its enactment but retroactively to the time the employment contracts started."  

APPLICABLE LAWS: 

"ART. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.  

"In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements:  

Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein.  

"In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year."  

"Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term 'one-half (1/2) month salary' shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves. "Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.  

"Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions provided under Article 288 of this Code." 

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC) v VENERACION (Natural Resources)

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC) v VENERACION 

G.R. No. 129820             

November 30, 2006  

FACTS:   

This case involves the conflicting claims of the petitioner Philippine National Oil Corporation-Energy Development Corporation and the respondent over the mining rights over Block 159 of the Malangas Coal Reservation, Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:  

*RED of the DENR Office in Zamboanga City: ruled in favor of VENERACION and ordered the PNOC to amend its Mineral Production Sharing Agreement [MPSA] by excluding therefrom Block 159 *DENR secretary: dismissed the appeal on the ground that petitioner's right to appeal had already prescribed.Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463 provides therefore for a five-day reglementary period from the receipt of the order or decision of the Director. *DENR secretary (motion for reconsideration): reversed the Decision, dated 4 October 1994, and gave due course to the MPSA of the petitioner. *DENR secretary (2nd motion for reconsideration): ruled that the Orders issued by the RED have already become final and executory when the petitioner failed to file its appeal five days after it had received the Orders. *MAB (took cognizance pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act): filed its appeal beyond the five-day prescriptive period provided under Presidential Decree No. 463, which was then the governing law on the matter.  

ISSUES:  

(1) whether or not the petitioner has already lost its right to appeal the RED's Order dated 12 April 1993; and  

(2) whether or not the petitioner acquired a preferential right on mining rights over Block 159.  

HELD: *On propriety of appeal: The correct mode of appeal would have been to file a petition for review under Rule 43, before the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this Court has taken into account the fact that these cases [which provided the doctrine] were promulgated after the petitioner filed this appeal on 4 August 1997, and decided to take cognizance of the present case.  

(1) YES, the right to appeal is lost. Petitioner's insistence that the 30-day reglementary period provided by Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended, applies, cannot be sustained by this Court. By providing a five-day period within which to file an appeal on the decisions of the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences, Presidential Decree No. 463 unquestionably repealed Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137.  

Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. The right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.  

In the instant case, petitioner failed to state any compelling reason for not filing its appeal within the mandated period. Instead, the records show that after failing to comply with the period within which to file their motion for reconsideration on time, they again failed to file their appeal before the Office of the DENR Secretary within the time provided by law.  

(2) NO, Even if petitioner had not lost its right to appeal, it cannot claim any mining rights over Block 159 for failure to comply with the legal requirements.  

SEC. 15. Government Reserved Land. – Lands reserved by the Government for purposes other than mining are open to prospecting. Any interested party may file an application therefore with the head of the agency administering said land, subject always to compliance with pertinent laws and rules and regulations covering such reserved land. Such application shall be acted upon within thirty (30) days. In such cases, the compensation due the surface owner shall accrue equally to the agency administering the reserved land and the Bureau of Mines.  

The law enumerates the following requirements:  

(1) a prospecting permit from the agency that has jurisdiction over the area, in this case, the OEA;  

(2) an exploration permit from the BMGS; 

(3) if the exploration reveals the presence of commercial deposit, the permitee applies before the BMGS for the exclusion of the area from the reservation; 

(4) granting by the president of the application to exclude the area from the reservation; and  

(5) a mining agreement approved by the DENR Secretary.  

In this case, petitioner complied with the first requirement and obtained a prospecting permit from the OEA. In its correspondence with the petitioner, the OEA, however, advised the petitioner on two separate occasions to obtain a "prospecting permit" from the BMGS, although the OEA was probably referring to an exploration permit. The petitioner did not apply for an exploration permit with the BMGS, nor would the BMGS have granted petitioner an exploration permit because when petitioner wrote to the BMGS informing the latter of its intention to enter into an MPSA with the DENR over Block 159, the BMGS informed the petitioner that the respondent's claim over Block 159 had already preceded that of the petitioner. The advice given by the BMGS was justified since at that time, the respondent already had a pending application for the exclusion of Block 159 from the Malangas Coal Reservation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed his MPSA application, without complying with the second, third and fourth requisites. Since it ignored the sound advice of the OEA and the BMGS, the government agencies concerned, and stubbornly insisted on its incorrect procedure, petitioner cannot complain now that its MPSA was revoked for failure to comply with the legal requirements.  

OBITER DICTA: 

(1) Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have recognized a distinction between 

(1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative nature, such as "granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling applications, or deciding conflicting applications," and 

(2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.  

(2) Findings of fact by the Mines Adjudication Board, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the panel of arbitrators, shall be conclusive and binding on the parties, and its decision or order shall be final and executory. But resort to the appropriate court, through a petition for review by certiorari, involving questions of law, may be made within thirty days from the receipt of the order or decision of the Mines Adjudication Board.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA (Environmental Law)

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA  

GR No. 110120 

March 16, 1994 

FACTS:

The  LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the  City Government of  Caloocan was  maintaining an open  dumpsite at the  Camarin  area  without  first  securing  an  Environmental  Compliance  Certificate  (ECC)  from  the  Environmental Management  Bureau  (EMB)  of  the  Department  of  Environment  and  Natural  Resources,  as  required  under Presidential  Decree  N o.  1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o.  4850 and issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite. 

ISSUES:

1. Does  the LLDA  and  its  amendatory  laws,  have  the  authority  to  entertain  the complaint  against  the  dumping  of garbage  in  the  open  dumpsite  in  Barangay  Camarin  authorized  by  the  City  Government  of  Caloocan?  

2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority  to issue a "cease and desist" order? 

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:  Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:  (d)  Make,  alter  or  modify  orders  requiring  the  discontinuance  of  pollution  specifying  the  conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished 

• As a  general rule,  the adjudication  of pollution  cases generally pertains  to the  Pollution Adjudication  Board (PAB), except  in  cases  w here  the  special  law   provides  for  another  forum 

RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It  must  be  recognized  in  this  regard  that  the LLDA,  as  a  specialized  administrative  agency,  is  specifically  mandated  under  Republic  Act  No.  4850  and  its amendatory law s  to carry out and  make effective the declared  national policy of  promoting and  accelerating the development  and  balanced  growth  of  the  Laguna  Lake  area  and  the  surrounding  provinces  of  Rizal  and  Laguna and the  cities of San Pablo,  Manila, Pasay, Quezon  and Caloocan with  due regard  and  adequate provisions  for environmental  management and  control, preservation  of  the quality  of human  life  and ecological  systems, and  the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a  broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna  Lake  region  from  the  deleterious  effects  of  pollutants  emanating  from  the  discharge  of  wastes  from  the surrounding  areas.  

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is  a fundamental rule that an  administrative agency has only  such powers as are expressly  granted to it by law , it is  likewise a settled rule that an administrative  agency has also such powers as  are necessarily implied in the  exercise  of  its  ex press  powers. In  the  exercise,  therefore,  of  its  express  powers  under  its  charter  as  a regulatory  and  quasi-judicial  body  with  respect  to  pollution  cases  in  the  Laguna  Lake  region,  the  authority  of  the LLDA  to  issue  a "cease  and  desist  order"  is,  perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER,  writs  of  mandamus  and  injunction are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.