Celestial Nickel Mining Corporation v Macro-asia (Environmental Law)

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING CORPORATION v  MACRO-ASIA 

G.R. No. 169080 

December 19, 2007  

FACTS:  

On September 24, 1973, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract (V-1050) for a term of 25 years up to September 23, 1998 for mining lode claims covering an area of 216 hectares at Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brooke's Point, Palawan.  

Infanta's corporate name was changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation on January 26, 1994 and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation, on November 6, 1995. 

Sometime in 1997, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.  The petition was docketed as DENR Case No. 97-01.  

Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas contiguous to Infanta's (now Macroasia) mining lode claims.  

Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia's lease contracts on the following grounds: (1) the nonpayment of Macroasia of required occupational fees and municipal taxes; (2) the non-filing of Macroasia of Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations; (3) the failure of Macroasia to provide improvements on subject mining claims; (4) the concentration of Macroasia on logging; (5) the encroachment, mining, and extraction by Macroasia of nickel ore from Celestial's property; (6) the ability of Celestial to subject the mining areas to commercial production; and (7) the  willingness of Celestial to pay fees and back taxes of Macroasia.  

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 

* POA: the POA found that Macroasia and Lebach not only automatically abandoned their areas/mining claims but likewise had lost all their rights to the mining claims. The POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the following Mining Lease Contracts * MAB: affirmed POA. The MAB found that Macroasia did not comply with its work obligations from 1986 to 1991.  

However, contrary to the findings of the POA, the MAB found that it was Blue Ridge that had prior and preferential rights over the mining claims of Macroasia, and not Celestial. In case Blue Ridge defaults, Celestial could exercise the secondary priority and preferential rights, and subsequently, in case Celestial also defaults, other qualified applicants could file.  

(motion for reconsideration) Macroasia, in its Motion for Reconsideration, reiterated that it did not abandon its mining claims, and even if mining was not listed among its purposes in its amended Articles of Incorporation, its mining activities were acts that were only ultra vires but were ratified as a secondary purpose by its stockholders in subsequent amendments of  its Articles of Incorporation.  

(special motion for reconsideration) Macroasia averred that the power and authority to grant, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements is exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.  Macroasia further pointed out that in arrogating upon itself such power, the POA whimsically and capriciously discarded the procedure on conferment of mining rights laid down in Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and DENR Administrative Order No. (AO) 96-40.  

* MAB (on issue of jurisdiction): The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary; that a petition for cancellation is not a mining dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA pursuant to Sec. 77 of RA 7942; and that the POA could only adjudicate claims or contests during the MPSA application and not when the claims and leases were already granted and subsisting.  

IRONIC DECISIONS OF THE CA 

* CA (Celestial appeal): affirmed the November 26, 2004 MAB Resolution which declared Macroasia's seven mining lease contracts as subsisting; rejected Blue Ridge's claim for preferential right over said mining claims; and upheld  the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements.  

* CA (Blue Ridge's appeal): granted Blue Ridge's petition; reversed and set aside the November 26, 2004 and July 12, 2005 Resolutions of the MAB; and reinstated the October 24, 2000 Decision in MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97. The Special Tenth Division canceled Macroasia's lease contracts; granted Blue Ridge prior and preferential rights; and treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.  

ISSUE: who has authority and jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral agreements under RA 7942 in relation to PD 463 and pertinent rules and regulations?  

HELD: DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons:  

1.       The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987;  

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that a. manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development of all mineral resources of the country; b. has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands; c. has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which include mineral resources.  

Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.  

2.    RA 7942 confers to the DENR Secretary specific authority over mineral resources.  

To enforce PD 463, the CMAO containing the rules and regulations implementing PD 463 was issued.  Sec. 44 of the CMAO provides:  

SEC. 44.  Procedure for Cancellation.––Before any mining lease contract is cancelled for any cause enumerated in Section 43 above, the mining lessee shall first be notified in writing of such cause or causes, and shall be given an opportunity to be heard, and to show cause why the lease shall not be cancelled.  

If, upon investigation, the Secretary shall find the lessee to be in default, the former may warn the lessee, suspend his operations or CANCEL THE LEASE CONTRACT (emphasis supplied).  

Sec. 4 of EO 279 provided that the provisions of PD 463 and its implementing rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the executive order, continue in force and effect.  

When RA 7942 took effect on March 3, 1995, there was no provision on who could cancel mineral agreements. However, since the aforequoted Sec. 44 of the CMAO implementing PD 463 was not repealed by RA 7942 and DENR AO 96-40, not being contrary to any of the provisions in them, then it follows that Sec. 44 serves as basis for the DENR Secretary's authority to cancel mineral agreements.  

Historically, the DENR Secretary has the express power to approve mineral agreements or contracts and the implied power to cancel said agreements.  

3.       Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral agreements.  

Sec. 7.  Organization and Authority of the Bureau (MGB). e.         To CANCEL OR TO RECOMMEND CANCELLATION AFTER DUE PROCESS, MINING RIGHTS, mining applications and mining claims for non-compliance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.  

It is explicit from the foregoing provision that the DENR Secretary has the authority to cancel mineral agreements based on the recommendation of the MGB Director.  As a matter of fact, the power to cancel mining rights can even be delegated by the DENR Secretary to the MGB Director.  Clearly, it is the Secretary, not the POA, that has authority and jurisdiction over cancellation of existing mining contracts or mineral agreements.  

4.       The DENR Secretary's power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral agreement/ FTAA.  

As the MGB is under the supervision of the DENR Secretary, then the logical conclusion is that it is the DENR Secretary who can cancel the mineral agreements and not the POA nor the MAB.  

5.       Celestial and Blue Ridge are not unaware of the stipulations in the Mining Lease Contract Nos. V-1050 and MRD-52,[50] the cancellation of which they sought from the POA. It is clear from said lease contracts that the parties are the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now DENR Secretary) as lessor, and Infanta (Macroasia) as lessee. [which declares that the lessor can order the lease cancelled) 

RATIO: (1) RA 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995 enacted on March 3, 1995, repealed the provisions of PD 463 inconsistent with RA 7942.  Unlike PD 463, where the application was filed with the Bureau of Mines Director, the applications for mineral agreements are now required to be filed with the Regional Director as provided by Sec. 29 of RA 7942. The proper filing gave the proponent the prior right to be approved by the Secretary and thereafter to be submitted to the President. The President shall provide a list to Congress of every approved mineral agreement within 30 days from its approval by the Secretary.  Again, RA 7942 is silent on who has authority to cancel the agreement.  

Compared to PD 463 where disputes were decided by the Bureau of Mines Director whose decisions were appealable to the DENR Secretary and then to the President, RA 7942 now provides for the creation of quasi-judicial bodies (POA and MAB) that would have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the applications and mineral agreements.  Secs. 77, 78, and 79 lay down the procedure, thus:  

SEC. 77.  Panel of Arbitrators.––There shall be a panel of arbitrators in the regional office of the Department composed of three (3) members, two (2) of whom must be members of the Philippine Bar in good standing and one [1] licensed mining engineer or a professional in a related field, and duly designated by the Secretary as recommended by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director.  Those designated as members of the panel shall serve as such in addition to their work in the Department without receiving any additional compensation.  As much as practicable, said members shall come from the different bureaus of the Department in the region.  The presiding officer thereof shall be selected by the drawing of lots.  His tenure as presiding officer shall be on a yearly basis. The members of the panel shall perform their duties and obligations in hearing and deciding cases until their designation is withdrawn or revoked by the Secretary.  Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:  

(a)        DISPUTES INVOLVING RIGHTS TO MINING AREAS;  

[NOTE: The phrase “disputes involving rights to mining areas” refers to any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an APPLICATION FOR MINERAL AGREEMENTS. The POA therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to a pending application for a mineral agreement filed with the concerned Regional Office of the MGB.  

Clearly, POA's jurisdiction over “disputes involving rights to mining areas” has nothing to do with the cancellation of existing mineral agreements.]  

(b)        DISPUTES INVOLVING MINERAL AGREEMENTS OR PERMITS;  

[A petition for the cancellation of an existing mineral agreement covering an area applied for by an applicant based on the alleged violation of any of the terms thereof, is not a “dispute” involving a mineral agreement under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942.  It does not pertain to a violation by a party of the right of another.  The applicant is not a real party-in-interest as he does not have a material or substantial interest in the mineral agreement but only a prospective or expectant right or interest in the mining area.  He has no legal right to such mining claim and hence no dispute can arise between the applicant and the parties to the mineral agreement.  The court rules therefore that a petition for cancellation of a mineral agreement anchored on the breach thereof even if filed by an applicant to a mining claim, like Celestial and Blue Ridge, falls within the jurisdiction of the DENR Secretary and not POA. Such petition is excluded from the coverage of the POA's jurisdiction over disputes involving mineral agreements under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942.]  

(c)        Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and          claimholders/concessionaires; and  

(d)        Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.  

SEC. 78.  Appellate Jurisdiction.—The decision or order of the panel of arbitrators may be appealed by the party not satisfied thereto to the Mines Adjudication Board within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof which must decide the case within thirty (30) days from submission thereof for decision.  

SEC. 79.  Mines Adjudication Board.—The Mines Adjudication Board shall be composed of three (3) members. The Secretary shall be the chairman with the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau and the Undersecretary for Operations of the Department as members thereof.  

(2) SEC. 8. Authority of the Department.––The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the States mineral resources including those in reservations, watershed areas, and lands of the public domain.  THE SECRETARY SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO MINERAL AGREEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE DIRECTOR, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the intent and provisions of this Act.  

SEC. 29. Filing and approval of Mineral Agreements.––x x x.  

The filing of a proposal for a mineral agreement shall give the proponent the prior right to areas covered by the same. THE PROPOSED MINERAL AGREEMENT WILL BE APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY and copies thereof shall be submitted to the President. Thereafter, the President shall provide a list to Congress of every approved mineral agreement within thirty (30) days from its approval by the Secretary.  (Emphasis supplied.)  

OBITER DICTA: 

(1) a preferential right would at most be an inchoate right to be given priority in the grant of a mining agreement. It has not yet been transformed into a legal and vested right unless approved by the MGB or DENR Secretary.  Even if Blue Ridge has a preferential right over the subject mining claims, it is still within the competence and discretion of the DENR Secretary to grant mineral agreements to whomever he deems best to pursue the mining claims over and above the preferential status given to Blue Ridge. Besides, being simply a preferential right, it is ineffective to dissolve the pre-existing or subsisting mining lease contracts of Macroasia.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA (Environmental Law)

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA  

GR No. 110120 

March 16, 1994 

FACTS:

The  LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the  City Government of  Caloocan was  maintaining an open  dumpsite at the  Camarin  area  without  first  securing  an  Environmental  Compliance  Certificate  (ECC)  from  the  Environmental Management  Bureau  (EMB)  of  the  Department  of  Environment  and  Natural  Resources,  as  required  under Presidential  Decree  N o.  1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o.  4850 and issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite. 

ISSUES:

1. Does  the LLDA  and  its  amendatory  laws,  have  the  authority  to  entertain  the complaint  against  the  dumping  of garbage  in  the  open  dumpsite  in  Barangay  Camarin  authorized  by  the  City  Government  of  Caloocan?  

2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority  to issue a "cease and desist" order? 

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:  Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:  (d)  Make,  alter  or  modify  orders  requiring  the  discontinuance  of  pollution  specifying  the  conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished 

• As a  general rule,  the adjudication  of pollution  cases generally pertains  to the  Pollution Adjudication  Board (PAB), except  in  cases  w here  the  special  law   provides  for  another  forum 

RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It  must  be  recognized  in  this  regard  that  the LLDA,  as  a  specialized  administrative  agency,  is  specifically  mandated  under  Republic  Act  No.  4850  and  its amendatory law s  to carry out and  make effective the declared  national policy of  promoting and  accelerating the development  and  balanced  growth  of  the  Laguna  Lake  area  and  the  surrounding  provinces  of  Rizal  and  Laguna and the  cities of San Pablo,  Manila, Pasay, Quezon  and Caloocan with  due regard  and  adequate provisions  for environmental  management and  control, preservation  of  the quality  of human  life  and ecological  systems, and  the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a  broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna  Lake  region  from  the  deleterious  effects  of  pollutants  emanating  from  the  discharge  of  wastes  from  the surrounding  areas.  

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is  a fundamental rule that an  administrative agency has only  such powers as are expressly  granted to it by law , it is  likewise a settled rule that an administrative  agency has also such powers as  are necessarily implied in the  exercise  of  its  ex press  powers. In  the  exercise,  therefore,  of  its  express  powers  under  its  charter  as  a regulatory  and  quasi-judicial  body  with  respect  to  pollution  cases  in  the  Laguna  Lake  region,  the  authority  of  the LLDA  to  issue  a "cease  and  desist  order"  is,  perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER,  writs  of  mandamus  and  injunction are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.    

Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association Inc. v City of Davao (Environmental Law)

Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association Inc. v City of Davao  

January 9, 2009 

CA Mindanao Station, Lantion 

NOTE: still pending in the SC

FACTS:

Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07, Series of 2007: “An Ordinance Banning Aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all agricultural entities in Davao City” 

RTC: rendered ordinance valid and unconstitutional 

ISSUES:

WON the ordinance banning aerial spraying is unconstitutional Constitutional right to health and to a healthful and balanced ecology. 

RULING:

(Still pending SC decision)  

CA: UNCONSTITUTIONAL & INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER 

It is within the mandate and authority of the City of Davao to enact Ordinance since it is a measure that has an ostensible LAWFUL SUBJECT: protection of public health and the environment against the alleged harmful effects of aerial spraying of pesticides or fungicides.  

However, UNLAWFUL MEANS since unduly oppressive to individuals and the three months period shift from aerial spraying to ground spraying unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with.  

City of Davao lacked: 

- Technical understanding on the intricacies of the engineering works required for the efficient operation of banana plantations, indifference to corporeal rights of banana planters to protect and enhance their investments. 

- To abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert and adopt other spraying practices would preclude the banana planters from being able to fertilize their plantations… Such an apparent eventuality would prejudice the operation of the plantations and the economic repercussions thereof would just be akin to shutting down the venture.  

• Also, since SEPARABILITY CLAUSE IS NON-EXISTING, the whole ordinance is unconstitutional. 

• No scientific basis for banning aerial spraying. Testimonies in favor of City of Davao did not prove that the aerial spraying of substances is the proximate cause of the various ailments the victims allegedly suffered. 

• EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE – it does NOT classify which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and the environment 

• Ordinance is confiscation of property without due process of law, it deprives plantation owners of the lawful and beneficial use of such areas to be ceded, without just compensation (with regards to buffer zones required by the ordinance)

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay  

GR No. 171947-48 

December 18, 2008  

FACTS:

The  complaint by the residents  alleged  that  the  water  quality  of  the  Manila  Bay  had  fallen  way below  the  allowable  standards   set  by  law,  specifically  Presidential   Decree  No.  (PD)  1152  or the  Philippine  Environment  Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.  

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and  20 of  PD 1152  under the headings, Upgrading  of  Water  Quality  and  Clean-up  Operations, envisage  a  cleanup  in general   or  are  they  limited only  to  the  cleanup  of  specific  pollution  incidents; 

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay. 

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section   17.  Upgrading  of   Water  Quality.–– Where  the  quality   of   water  has  deteriorated  t o  a degree  where it s  state will   adversely  affect   its  best  u sage,  the government   agencies concerned  shall take  such   measures  as  may   be  necessary   to  upgrade  the  quality   of   such   water  to  meet   the prescribed water quality  standards. Section  20. Clean-up Operations.––It   shall  be  the responsibility   of  the  polluter to  contain , remove and  clean - up  water  pollution   incidents  at   his  own   expense.  In case  of   his  failure  to  do  so,  the government  agencies  concerned shall   undertake  containment, removal and clean-up  operations and expenses incurred in  said operation shall  be  charged against  the persons and/ or entities responsible for  such  pollution.      

HELD:

(1) Sec.  17  does   not  in  any  way  state  that the  government  agencies concerned  ought  to  confine  themselves   to  the  containment, removal,  and cleaning operations   when a  specific  pollution incident  occurs.  On the  contrary, Sec.  17  requires   them  to  act  even  in  the  absence  of  a  specific  pollution  incident,  as   long  as water quality “has  deteriorated to a degree where its  state will  adversely affect its  best usage.”  Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact  that the pollution of  the Manila Bay  is   of  such magnitude  and  scope  that  it  is   well -nigh impossible  to  draw  the line  between  a  specific  and  a  general   pollution  incident. 

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.  While the implementation of  the MMDA's   mandated  tasks   may  entail a decision-making  process, the enforcement  of  the law or the very  act  of  doing  what  the  law exacts   to  be  done  is   ministerial   in  nature and  may be  compelled  by  mandamus.  Under  what  other  judicial   discipline  describes   as   “continuing mandamus ,” the Court  may,  under  extraordinary circumstances,  issue  directives  with  the end in view  of ensuring that its  decision  would not be set to naught  by administrative inaction or indifference. 

NOTE:  This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure for environmental cases. 

20 days – Temporary restraining order  

Tano v Socrates (Environmental Law)

Tano v Socrates  

GR No. 110249 

August 21, 1997 

FACTS:

The  Sangguniang  Panlungsod  ng  Puerto  Princesa  City  enacted  Ordinance  N o. 15-92  which  took  effect  on  January  1,  1993  entitled:  "AN   ORDINANCE  BANNING  THE  SHIPMENT  OF  ALL LIVE  FISH   AND  LOBSTER  OUTSIDE  PUERTO  PRINCESA  CITY  FROM  JANUARY  1,  1993  TO  JANUARY  1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF. 

ISSUE:

Is the ordinance valid and constitutional? 

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Section 2 of Article X I I  reads: The  State  shall  protect  the  nation' s  marine  wealth  in  its  archipelagic  waters,  territorial  sea,  and  exclusive economic z one, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The  Congress  may,  by  law ,  allow   small-scale  utilization  of  natural  resources  by  Filipino  citizens,  as  w ell  as cooperative  fish  farming,  with  priority  to  subsistence  fishermen  and  fishworkers  in  rivers,  lakes,  bays,  and lagoons. 

• Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII  provide: Sec. 2.  The promotion of  social justice  shall include the  commitment to create  economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. x x x  x x x  x x x Sec. 7.  The State shall protect  the rights of subsistence  fishermen, especially of local  communities, to the  preferential  use of  the communal  marine  and fishing  resources,  both  inland  and offshore.  It shall provide  support to  such fishermen  through appropriate  technology and  research, adequate  financial, production,  and marketing  assistance, and  other  services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources.  The  protection  shall  ex tend  to  offshore  fishing  grounds  of  subsistence fishermen  against  foreign  intrusion.  Fishworkers  shall  receive  a  just  share  from  their  labor  in  the utilization of marine and fishing resources. 

• General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:  

SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).  

RULING:

YES. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.  

Both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes:  

(1) to establish a “closed season” for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and   

(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.  It is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters.  In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing In the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible. 

Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)

Henares v LTFRB  

GR No. 158290 

October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us? 

(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution 

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.  

• Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."  SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment: 

a) The right to breathe clean air; 

b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable development; 

c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making process; 

d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health; 

e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances; 

f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act; 

g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and 

h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a project or activity. 

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly. 

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.  Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.  

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.